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RISING CONFUSION ABOUT “ARISING UNDER” 
JURISDICTION IN PATENT CASES 
Paul R. Gugliuzza* 
ABSTRACT 
By statute, all cases “arising under” patent law must be heard exclusively 
by the federal courts (not state courts) and, on appeal, by the Federal Circuit 
(not the twelve regional circuits). But not all cases involving patents “arise 
under” patent law. As recently as 2013, the Supreme Court ruled that the mere 
need to apply patent law in, for example, a malpractice case involving a patent 
lawyer, is insufficient to trigger exclusive jurisdiction. Rather, the Court held, 
for a case that does not involve claims of patent infringement to arise under 
patent law, the patent issue must be “important … to the federal system as a 
whole.”  
Despite the Supreme Court’s holding that “fact-bound and situation-
specific” patent issues do not warrant exclusive jurisdiction outside of 
infringement cases, the lower courts’ precedent in this area remains unsettled. 
The Federal Circuit has, at times, tried to resurrect its older case law extending 
exclusive jurisdiction to practically any patent-related tort, contract, or antitrust 
case. But, in other decisions, the Federal Circuit has constricted jurisdiction so 
dramatically that the Fifth Circuit recently refused to accept a case transferred 
to it by the Federal Circuit, deriding the Federal Circuit’s jurisdictional ruling 
as not just wrong but “implausible.” All of this uncertainty incentivizes costly 
and wasteful procedural maneuvering in a field where litigation is already 
expensive. 
This Article is the first to chronicle the rising confusion about the scope of 
the federal district courts’ and the Federal Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction over 
cases arising under patent law. The Article critiques the case law emerging in 
the lower federal courts and proposes a jurisdictional rule that is both clear and 
consistent with Supreme Court precedent: For a case that does not involve 
claims of patent infringement to nevertheless arise under patent law, it must 
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present a dispute about the content of federal patent law or a question about the 
interpretation or validity of the federal patent statute; questions about the 
validity or scope of a particular patent are not sufficient.  
In arguing for this new approach, the Article also engages broader questions 
about the jurisdictional structure of patent litigation. Among other things, it 
suggests that the courts or Congress should rethink longstanding doctrine that 
makes the test for Federal Circuit appellate jurisdiction identical to the test for 
exclusive original jurisdiction in the district courts. Exclusive district court 
jurisdiction entirely precludes state courts from shaping their own state’s law, 
so federal courts should be hesitant to exercise jurisdiction over a tort or 
contract claim simply because there is a patent lurking in the background. But 
when a patent-related case is properly in federal district court, the Federal 
Circuit’s expertise in patent law and ability to provide uniformity counsel in 
favor of giving the court a broad scope of appellate jurisdiction.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The federal district courts have exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over 
cases “arising under” patent law.1 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over those same cases.2 At first blush, 
this regime seems simple: State courts may not hear patent cases, only federal 
courts can. And when there is an appeal in a patent case, it goes to the Federal 
Circuit, not one of the twelve regional circuits. Yet subject matter jurisdiction in 
patent cases is, surprisingly, one of the thorniest issues in all of civil procedure. 
In a 2013 opinion holding that legal malpractice claims against patent 
attorneys do not fall within the federal courts’ exclusive jurisdiction, Chief 
Justice Roberts noted that, in deciding the jurisdictional issue, “we do not paint 
on a blank canvas.”3 “Unfortunately,” he continued, “the canvas looks like one 
that Jackson Pollock got to first.”4 In an earlier Supreme Court case on the scope 
of the Federal Circuit’s appellate jurisdiction, the Court had to step in to stop 
what it called a “game of jurisdictional ping-pong” in which the dispute had been 
transferred from the Federal Circuit to the Seventh Circuit and back again to the 
Federal Circuit,5 with each court “adamantly disavow[ing] jurisdiction” and 
each court “insist[ing] that the other’s jurisdictional decision [was] ‘clearly 
wrong.’”6  
Despite frequent Supreme Court decisions on patent jurisdiction and recent 
congressional amendments to the relevant statutes,7 confusion persists. Indeed, 
as the title of this Article suggests,8 it seems to be getting worse. In February 
2019, in a decision that attracted widespread attention from both patent lawyers 
 
 1 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2012) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action 
arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents…. No State court shall have jurisdiction over any claim 
for relief arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents ….”). 
 2 Id. § 1295(a)(1) (“The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall have exclusive 
jurisdiction of an appeal from a final decision of a district court of the United States … in any civil action arising 
under, or in any civil action in which a party has asserted a compulsory counterclaim arising under, any Act of 
Congress relating to patents ….”). 
 3 Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 258 (2013). 
 4 Id.  
 5 Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 818 (1988). 
 6 Id. at 803 (citation omitted). 
 7 In addition to the Gunn and Christianson cases cited in the preceding footnotes, the Supreme Court 
tackled a patent-related issue of subject matter jurisdiction in Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation 
Systems, Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 830 (2002), holding that the Federal Circuit did not have jurisdiction over a case in 
which patent infringement was asserted only as a counterclaim—a decision Congress overruled in the America 
Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 19(b)(1), 125 Stat. 284, 331–32 (2011).  
 8 For inspiring that title, credit is due to Mark A. Lemley, The Ongoing Confusion Over Ongoing 
Royalties, 76 MO. L. REV. 695 (2011). 
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and scholars, the Fifth Circuit refused to decide an appeal that had been 
transferred to it by the Federal Circuit, deriding the Federal Circuit’s ruling 
declining jurisdiction as not just wrong but “implausible” and transferring the 
case back to the Federal Circuit.9 A month later, the Federal Circuit, despite 
numerous “flaws” it identified in the Fifth Circuit’s transfer opinion, reluctantly 
accepted jurisdiction, seemingly ending this particular match of jurisdictional 
table tennis.10 But the harsh words the Fifth Circuit and Federal Circuit traded 
about each other’s understanding of the relevant jurisdictional doctrine—as well 
as clear and persistent conflicts in the Federal Circuit’s own jurisdictional 
precedent11—suggests that the Supreme Court, or perhaps the Federal Circuit en 
banc, will eventually have to step in to alleviate the rising confusion over arising 
under jurisdiction in patent cases.12 
To be sure, in many patent disputes, subject matter jurisdiction is not 
seriously contested. A case in which a plaintiff asserts a claim of patent 
infringement, for example, plainly arises under patent law.13 The same goes for 
claims seeking declaratory judgments that a patent is invalid or not infringed.14 
Infringement and declaratory judgment claims are actually created by federal 
 
 9 Xitronix Corp. v. KLA-Tencor Corp., 916 F.3d 429, 431 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 2019 WL 
4921285 (U.S. Oct. 7, 2019); see also Christianson, 486 U.S. at 819 (holding that a transferee court should 
accept jurisdiction over a patent appeal so long as the transfer decision is “plausible” and not “clearly 
erroneous”). For a sample of commentary on the Xitronix case, see Dennis Crouch, Walker-Process Antitrust 
Case Is Back Before the Federal Circuit, PATENTLYO (Feb. 24, 2019), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2019/02/ 
process-antitrust-federal.html; Bryan Koenig, Xitronix Patent Antitrust Row Not Welcome at 5th Circ. Either, 
LAW360 (Feb. 19, 2019, 7:56 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1130148; Mark Lemley (@marklemley), 
TWITTER (Feb. 20, 2019, 8:30 PM), https://twitter.com/marklemley/status/1098394441436413952 (“Anyone 
want a patent-antitrust case? The Federal Circuit sent this case to the Fifth Circuit, saying they didn’t have 
jurisdiction. The Fifth Circuit just sent it back, saying [the Federal Circuit] w[as] the only court that DID have 
jurisdiction.”).  
 10 Xitronix Corp. v. KLA-Tencor Corp., 757 F. App’x 1008, 1010 (Fed. Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 2019 
WL 4921285 (U.S. Oct. 7, 2019). The Federal Circuit’s decision likewise grabbed headlines in the world of 
patent law. See, e.g., Tiffany Hu, Fed. Circ. Ends Ping-Pong with 5th Circ. on IP Antitrust Suit, LAW360 (Mar. 
14, 2019, 3:29 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1138869.  
 11 See infra Part II.B. 
 12 See Bryan Koenig, Justices’ Cert Denial Won’t Quell Circuit ‘Pingpong’ Matches, LAW360 (Oct. 18, 
2019, 8:05 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1211080/justices-cert-denial-won-t-quell-circuit-pingpong-
matches (noting that the Supreme Court’s denial of cert. in Xitronix “left intact binding precedent” in each 
circuit—the Federal Circuit and the Fifth Circuit—“that the case belonged in the other court”); Bryan Lammon, 
Cert Petition: Patent Appeals & Jurisdictional Hot Potato, FINAL DECISIONS (July 31, 2019), https:// 
finaldecisions.org/cert-petition-patent-appeals-jurisdictional-hot-potato (“[T]he state of the law must be 
maddening for practitioners. What are parties in future Walker Process suits to do? File in the regional circuit 
(which the Federal Circuit thinks is proper) but risk the regional circuit sending the case to the Federal Circuit 
(like the Fifth Circuit did)? Or should they file first in the Federal Circuit (which the Fifth Circuit thought was 
proper) and wait for the Federal Circuit to transfer the case to the regional circuit?”). 
 13 13D CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3582 (3d ed. 2008). 
 14 Id. 
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patent law,15 so there is no question that cases containing those claims fall within 
the federal courts’ and the Federal Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction.16 But 
confusion occurs because many cases that do not include claims for patent 
infringement nevertheless implicate patent law and therefore potentially “arise 
under” patent law for jurisdictional purposes.17 For example, plaintiffs often 
base antitrust claims on patent-related conduct.18 Though patent-related antitrust 
claims are usually (but not always) asserted under federal statutes such as the 
Sherman Act, claims created by state law can raise patent issues, too.19 Common 
examples include suits for breach of a patent licensing contract,20 tort claims 
based on false allegations of patent infringement,21 and malpractice claims 
against lawyers who litigated a prior infringement dispute or who prosecuted a 
patent.22 
Under current law, it is often unclear whether these patent-related cases 
“arise under” patent law for the purpose of triggering the federal district courts’ 
and the Federal Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction. For several decades, the Federal 
Circuit held that cases involving claims created by state law or by a federal law 
besides the Patent Act nevertheless arose under patent law any time the case 
required the court to apply patent law.23 Almost all claims for breach of a patent 
license agreement met that lenient standard because those cases usually focus on 
questions about patent scope (which determines the extent of the defendant’s 
obligation to pay royalties) and validity (because a ruling of invalidity can 
nullify the defendant’s obligation to pay any royalties at all). The same goes for 
most tort claims involving patent enforcement conduct because they usually 
 
 15 See 35 U.S.C. § 281 (2012). 
 16 See Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916) (Holmes, J.) (“A suit arises 
under the law that creates the cause of action.”).  
 17 See T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 827 (2d Cir. 1964) (Friendly, J.) (“It has come to be 
realized that Mr. Justice Holmes’ formula,” see supra note 16, “is more useful for inclusion than for the exclusion 
for which it was intended.”). See generally 13D WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 13, § 3582 (surveying the types of 
non-patent cases that arise under patent law). 
 18 See, e.g., Ark. Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 604 F.3d 98, 104 (2d Cir. 2010) 
(antitrust challenge to a “reverse payment” settlement of patent litigation); In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride 
Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (different appeal in the same litigation). 
 19 See, e.g., Eon Labs., Inc. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 298 F. Supp. 2d 175, 177 (D. Mass. 2003) 
(state antitrust claims based on the defendant’s conduct in enforcing a patent). 
 20 See generally Amelia Smith Rinehart, The Federal Question in Patent-License Cases, 90 IND. L.J. 659, 
662–68 (2015) (citing numerous case examples). 
 21 See generally Paul R. Gugliuzza, Patent Trolls and Preemption, 101 VA. L. REV. 1579, 1588–90 (2015) 
(citing case examples). 
 22 In addition to the Gunn case cited above, see generally Paul R. Gugliuzza, The Federal Circuit as a 
Federal Court, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1791, 1809–15 (2013) (citing additional malpractice cases). 
 23 See, e.g., Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 1998); 
Additive Controls & Measurement Sys., Inc. v. Flowdata, Inc., 986 F.2d 476, 478–79 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
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hinge on whether a patentee’s allegations of infringement were accurate. 
Similarly, patent-related malpractice claims ask what would have happened in 
patent infringement litigation or patent prosecution but for the attorney’s alleged 
negligence—a question that plainly requires the court to apply federal patent 
law.  
In a prior article,24 I argued that this Federal Circuit case law was in tension 
with Supreme Court precedent holding that the “mere need to apply federal law” 
will not cause a case to arise under that law.25 And, in 2013, the Supreme Court 
overturned the Federal Circuit’s precedent. In Gunn v. Minton, the Court held 
that malpractice claims against patent attorneys “will rarely, if ever, arise under 
federal patent law” because they implicate only backward-looking, case-specific 
issues that are not important “to the federal system as a whole.”26 
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Gunn seemed to offer a relatively clear rule: 
The mere need to apply patent law is not sufficient to cause a case to arise under 
patent law; rather, resolution of the patent issue must have significant 
consequences for more than just the parties to the case.27 But the Federal Circuit 
has a reputation for resisting the Supreme Court’s efforts to modify patent 
doctrine.28 As I show in this Article, the Federal Circuit has at times lived up to 
that reputation in the realm of subject matter jurisdiction.29  
Initially, the Federal Circuit tried to blunt the effects of Gunn by limiting the 
Supreme Court’s holding to its specific facts—interpreting the decision to 
preclude jurisdiction only when, as in the Gunn case itself, the relevant patent 
 
 24 See Gugliuzza, supra note 22, at 1815. 
 25 Grable & Sons Metal Prod., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 313 (2005). 
 26 568 U.S. 251, 258, 260 (2013). 
 27 See id. at 263–64 (ruling that federal jurisdiction did not exist because the effects of the case “would 
be limited to the parties and patents that [were] before the … court” and would not create “binding precedent for 
any future patent claim”). 
 28 See, e.g., Robin Feldman, Coming of Age for the Federal Circuit, 18 GREEN BAG 2D 27, 38 (2014) 
(“[T]hese opinions raise the possibility of the appearance that Federal Circuit judges are trying to resist Supreme 
Court precedent ….”); Roger Allan Ford, The Uneasy Case for Patent Federalism, 2017 WIS. L. REV. 551, 592 
(2017) (“The Federal Circuit is notorious for resisting Supreme Court guidance.”); Laura G. Pedraza-Fariña, 
Understanding the Federal Circuit: An Expert Community Approach, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 89, 124 (2015) 
(“An analysis of Federal Circuit case law reveals a pattern of resistance to implementing Supreme Court 
decisions overruling Federal Circuit precedent ….”). 
 29 Some commentators have suggested that the Federal Circuit has become more deferential to the 
Supreme Court over the past decade or so. See, e.g., Timothy R. Holbrook, The Federal Circuit’s 
Acquiescence(?), 66 AM. U. L. REV. 1061, 1064 (2017) (“The Supreme Court has reengaged with patent law, 
and, after an initial period of resistance, the Federal Circuit increasingly is following the Court’s precedent with 
little pushback.”). The analysis in this Article at least partly challenges that notion of Federal Circuit 
acquiescence. 
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had already been invalidated or was no longer in force.30 More recent Federal 
Circuit decisions—by different panels of judges—have attempted to walk back 
that cramped interpretation of Gunn.31 The results in those cases are more 
faithful to the Supreme Court’s precedent, but they raise their own problems. 
For one, although those Federal Circuit opinions probably reach the correct 
result under binding Supreme Court doctrine, the Federal Circuit’s reasoning has 
been highly suspect—so much so that the Fifth Circuit, as mentioned, recently 
sent a case back to the Federal Circuit because the Fifth Circuit found the Federal 
Circuit’s jurisdictional analysis to be deeply flawed.32 Moreover, the Federal 
Circuit’s decisions adopting a narrow conception of arising under jurisdiction 
create clear intracircuit splits that leave state courts, federal district courts, and 
the regional circuits—all of whom often must decide questions of patent 
jurisdiction in the first instance—with no helpful guidance from a court whose 
primary reason for existence is to provide uniformity in patent law.33  
This uncertainty encourages parties to engage in wasteful litigation about 
matters entirely collateral to the merits of the case—not something the law 
should incentivize in a field in which litigation is already expensive.34 And, to 
be clear, the consequences of a mistake about whether a case arises under patent 
law are severe. It is black-letter law that defects in subject matter jurisdiction 
may not be waived by the parties and can be raised at any time—including after 
trial or on appeal.35 Thus, a flaw in subject matter jurisdiction can wipe out years 
of litigation and result in millions of dollars wasted. 
The new jurisdictional regime proposed by this Article will help mitigate 
those effects by providing a clear rule that should be easy to apply in most cases. 
 
 30 See, e.g., Jang v. Bos. Sci. Corp., 767 F.3d 1334, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Forrester Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. 
Wheelabrator Techs., Inc., 715 F.3d 1329, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2013); see also Gunn, 568 U.S. at 261 (noting that, 
regardless of the outcome of the malpractice case, “Minton’s patent will remain invalid”), 
 31 See, e.g., Inspired Dev. Grp., LLC v. Inspired Prods. Grp., LLC, 938 F.3d 1355, 1366–67 (Fed. Cir. 
2019); Xitronix Corp. v. KLA-Tencor Corp., 882 F.3d 1075, 1078 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Alps South, LLC v. 
Shumaker, Loop & Kendrick, LLP, No. 2018-1717, 2018 WL 4522168, at *3 (Fed. Cir. June 14, 2018). 
 32 Xitronix Corp. v. KLA-Tencor Corp., 916 F.3d 429, 431 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 2019 WL 
4921285 (U.S. Oct. 7, 2019). 
 33 For an opinion highlighting the inconsistencies in the Federal Circuit’s recent jurisdictional decisions, 
see Xitronix Corp. v. KLA-Tencor Corp., 892 F.3d 1194, 1200 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (Newman, J., dissenting from 
the denial of the petition for rehearing en banc). 
 34 See generally Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Resilience of the Patent System, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1, 56 
(2016) (arguing that, because recent changes to patent law seem to have had little effect on patent acquisition 
and enforcement, reformers should instead “look out for opportunities to simplify patent litigation, making it 
quicker and cheaper” (emphasis added)). 
 35 13D WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 13, § 3522. In Gunn, for instance, the plaintiff—who chose to file the 
case in state court—was the party who objected to the state court’s subject matter jurisdiction, and he did so only 
on appeal after he had lost on the merits in the trial court. See Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 255 (2013). 
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Specifically, the Article argues that, as the Supreme Court suggested in Gunn, 
cases that do not contain claims for patent infringement or for declaratory 
judgments of invalidity or noninfringement should be viewed to arise under 
patent law only in rare circumstances.36 For such a case to trigger the federal 
courts’ and the Federal Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction, I argue, it should present 
a dispute about the content of federal patent law or a question about the 
interpretation or validity of the federal patent statute.37 This rule, which also 
clarifies some lingering ambiguities in the Gunn opinion itself,38 will probably 
not eliminate litigation over subject matter jurisdiction in patent cases. But it 
will make the law look less like a Jackson Pollock painting and more like a Mark 
Rothko.39 
Though this Article focuses primarily on a confusing issue at the intersection 
of patent law and civil procedure, its analysis has relevance beyond patent 
litigation. The question it examines—when does a case consisting entirely of 
non-patent claims nevertheless arise under federal patent law?—is a species of 
a particularly “vexing” question in civil procedure more broadly.40 Under the 
general federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the district courts have 
jurisdiction over all cases “arising under” federal law,41 so they sometimes must 
decide whether, in the absence of diversity jurisdiction, they can hear a case that 
involves only claims created by state law but that implicates issues of federal 
law.42 This Article is highly pertinent to that question, too: Not only do both the 
patent-specific and general federal question statutes use the same “arising under” 
terminology, the courts often treat patent and non-patent jurisdictional case law 
as interchangeable.43 
 
 36 See Gunn, 568 U.S. at 258 (characterizing the “category” of state law claims that nevertheless arise 
under federal law as “special and small” and “slim”). 
 37 See infra Part III.A.1. 
 38 See infra notes 282–95 and accompanying text. 
 39 Rothko’s most famous works are his so-called multiforms—blocks of various colors devoid of any 
landscape or human features. See Mark Rothko—Artist Gallery of Career Highlights Including His Most Famous 
Paintings, MARK ROTHKO, http://www.markrothko.org (last visited Nov. 10, 2019). The borders of Rothko’s 
blocks are blurry or slightly irregular, just as there will still be disputes at the boundaries of the jurisdictional 
rule I propose. But a Rothko painting portrays a sense of order that is largely absent from Pollock’s iconic drip 
paintings that Chief Justice Roberts referenced in Gunn. See, e.g., Jackson Pollock, One: Number 31, 1950 
(1950), MOMA.ORG, https://www.moma.org/collection/works/78386 (last visited Aug. 29, 2019). 
 40 13D WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 13, § 3562. 
 41 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising 
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”). 
 42 E.g., Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 311, 314–15 (2005) 
(upholding federal question jurisdiction over a state law quiet title case that turned on whether the IRS, when it 
seized the plaintiff’s land, had provided the plaintiff with the notice required by the federal tax statute). 
 43 Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 830 (2002) (“‘[L]inguistic 
consistency’ requires us to apply the same test to determine whether a case arises under § 1338(a) as under 
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Still, subject matter jurisdiction in patent cases merits its own study because, 
for at least three reasons, the stakes are potentially higher in disputes over patent 
jurisdiction than they are in federal question cases more generally. First, federal 
jurisdiction over cases that arise under patent law is exclusive of the state courts 
(unlike under the general federal question statute, where federal courts and state 
courts share concurrent jurisdiction), so disputes over patent jurisdiction have 
major federalism implications. If exclusive jurisdiction does indeed exist over a 
patent-related state law claim, then that state’s courts will be entirely prohibited 
from shaping their own state’s law in that area.44 Second, unlike under the 
general federal question statute, which is relevant only to the division of 
authority between the state and federal courts, the question of whether a case 
arises under patent law also implicates questions of appellate jurisdiction 
because it allocates cases between the Federal Circuit (which is thought to have 
special expertise in patent matters) and the regional circuits (which rarely hear 
patent cases). Finally, federal patent jurisdiction is animated by a unique policy 
aim: uniformity. Though uniformity is thought to be beneficial in all areas of 
law,45 judges and commentators frequently stress the singular importance of 
uniformity in patent cases, both in terms of the treatment of a given patent46 and 
in terms of legal doctrine more generally.47 These distinctive characteristics of 
patent litigation suggest a need for independent analysis about whether and in 
 
§ 1331.”); see also Madstad Eng’g, Inc. v. USPTO, 756 F.3d 1366, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“Through 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1338(a), Congress placed the resolution of actions arising under an Act of Congress relating to patents 
exclusively within the federal courts. Through 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1), Congress placed appeals from such 
matters exclusively within the province of the Federal Circuit.”). 
 44 See generally Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 264–65 (2013) (refusing to find exclusive federal 
jurisdiction over a patent-related malpractice case because “[t]he States … have ‘a special responsibility for 
maintaining standards among members of the licensed professions’” (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 
436 U.S. 447, 460 (1978))). 
 45 For a challenge to that conventional view, see Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV. 
1567, 1570–71 (2008). 
 46 See, e.g., Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 851 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(“Uniformity is a critical feature of our patent system because ‘[t]he limits of a patent must be known ….’” 
(quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 390 (1996))); Markman, 517 U.S. at 390 (“[W]e 
see the importance of uniformity in the treatment of a given patent as an independent reason to allocate all issues 
of [claim] construction to the court [rather than to a jury].”). 
 47 See, e.g., Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 649 (1999) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (identifying “national uniformity” as “the principle that undergirds all aspects of our 
patent system”); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 162–63 (1989) (“Given the 
inherently ephemeral nature of property in ideas, and the great power such property has to cause harm to the 
competitive policies which underlay the federal patent laws, the demarcation of broad zones of public and private 
right is the ‘type of regulation that demands a uniform national rule.’” (quoting Ray v. Atl. Richfield Co., 435 
U.S. 151, 179 (1978))); see also Paul R. Gugliuzza, Patent Law Federalism, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 11, 21 
(distinguishing between legal uniformity, that is, uniformity in the substantive rules of patent law, and 
adjudicative uniformity, that is, the notion that “a particular patent should be construed similarly from one case 
to another and that courts should not reach inconsistent validity findings regarding the same patent”). 
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what circumstances patent cases should be centralized in the federal district 
courts and the Federal Circuit as opposed to being distributed more widely 
among state courts or the regional circuits.48 
This Article’s analysis of subject matter jurisdiction in patent cases also 
raises deeper questions about the institutional design of and judicial behavior in 
the patent system. In terms of institutional design, the Article argues that it 
makes little sense to have identical tests for Federal Circuit appellate jurisdiction 
and exclusive district court jurisdiction, as is the case under current law. For the 
district courts, there are good reasons, grounded in concerns about federalism 
and comity, to be cautious about asserting exclusive jurisdiction over state law 
claims just because there is a patent in the case.49 But once a patent-related case 
is properly in federal court (because, for instance, diversity jurisdiction 
indisputably exists), there are no similarly good reasons for the Federal Circuit—
which was created to provide uniformity and expertise on patent matters50—to 
defer to the other federal courts of appeals. Accordingly, the relevant 
jurisdictional statutes should be amended by Congress or reinterpreted by the 
courts to make the test for Federal Circuit appellate jurisdiction broader than the 
test for exclusive district court jurisdiction.51 
In terms of judicial behavior, the Article demonstrates that the divergent 
views about jurisdiction espoused in the Federal Circuit’s case law are highly 
judge-specific.52 Certain judges consistently interpret the scope of arising under 
jurisdiction broadly, while other judges consistently take a narrower view. 
Though the set of post-Gunn jurisdictional decisions is small, this Article’s 
analysis contributes to a robust literature documenting panel-dependency on the 
Federal Circuit in numerous areas of patent law.53 The deep-seated and divergent 
 
 48 See generally Gugliuzza, supra note 47, at 69–71 (questioning whether exclusive federal jurisdiction 
is necessary to ensure legal and adjudicative uniformity in patent matters); Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, 
Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity Principle, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1619, 1623 (2007) (challenging the view 
that the need for uniformity warrants appellate centralization of patent cases).  
 49 See generally 13D WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 13, § 3562 (noting that “the overzealous exercise of 
federal question jurisdiction [can] threaten the legitimate interest of the states in having their courts interpret 
state law”). 
 50 See Paul R. Gugliuzza, Rethinking Federal Circuit Jurisdiction, 100 GEO. L.J. 1437, 1456 (2012). 
 51 See infra Part III.B. 
 52 See infra Part III.C. 
 53 See, e.g., Paul R. Gugliuzza & Mark A. Lemley, Can a Court Change the Law by Saying Nothing?, 71 
VAND. L. REV. 765, 801 (2018) (finding links between particular judges’ substantive views on patentable subject 
matter doctrine and those judges’ tendency to decide cases involving that issue in precedential versus 
nonprecedential decisions); R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An 
Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1163 (2004) (finding evidence of panel 
dependency on the question of patent claim construction). 
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views held by the court’s judges underscore the need for new, clearer 
jurisdictional rules—such as those proposed in this Article—that would be 
harder to manipulate in service of a preferred policy outcome. The intracircuit 
inconsistencies in Federal Circuit jurisdictional law also highlight a potential 
shortcoming of the Federal Circuit as an institution54: The narrowness of the 
court’s jurisdiction encourages its judges to develop definite and detailed 
normative preferences about issues of patent law and policy, and it provides 
them with ample opportunities to express and implement those preferences. 
These dynamics create confusion for litigants and judges, that confusion 
increases litigation costs, and those litigation costs can chill innovation—
defeating the very purpose of having a patent system in the first place.55 
The remainder of this Article proceeds in three parts. Part I provides 
necessary background on the law governing federal subject matter jurisdiction, 
both in patent cases and otherwise. Part II documents the persistent and 
continuing confusion about the federal courts’ and the Federal Circuit’s 
jurisdiction over patent cases, and it provides a thorough critique of post-Gunn 
developments in both the Federal Circuit and the regional circuits. Finally, Part 
III sketches a novel jurisdictional rule that is faithful to Supreme Court 
precedent, would reduce litigation over forum selection, and would balance the 
need for uniformity in patent law with the autonomy of state courts to shape their 
own states’ laws, including in patent-related cases. Part III also tackles two 
fundamental questions about the institutional structure of patent litigation, 
proposing a new test for Federal Circuit appellate jurisdiction that is broader 
than the test for exclusive district court jurisdiction and examining what the 
panel dependency of the Federal Circuit’s jurisdictional case law indicates about 
judicial behavior on specialized courts. 
I. THE FEDERAL COURTS’ SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION: OVER PATENT 
CASES AND OTHERWISE 
To start, a primer on the federal courts’ subject matter jurisdiction over cases 
involving federal law, and patent cases specifically, will prove helpful. This Part 
first summarizes the statutory bases for that jurisdiction and describes the types 
 
 54 For a foundational analysis of the Federal Circuit as an institution, see Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The 
Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1989). For an extensive bibliography 
of the relevant literature, see Ryan Vacca, The Federal Circuit as an Institution, in 2 RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON 
THE ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 104, 155-57 (Peter S. Menell, David L. Schwartz & Ben 
Depoorter eds. 2019). 
 55 On the connection between litigation dynamics and innovation incentives, see generally Paul R. 
Gugliuzza, The Procedure of Patent Eligibility, 97 TEX. L. REV. 571, 643 (2019). 
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of disputes that qualify for adjudication by the federal courts. It then surveys the 
Federal Circuit’s historically expansive understanding of the scope of its and the 
lower federal courts’ exclusive jurisdiction over patent disputes—an 
understanding the Supreme Court rejected in 2013 in Gunn v. Minton.56 
A. “Arising Under” Jurisdiction: The Basics 
Under the general federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the federal 
courts have subject matter jurisdiction over cases “arising under” federal law.57 
This jurisdiction is concurrent with the state courts—if a plaintiff files a federal 
question case in state court and the defendant does not (or cannot) remove it, 
then the federal case will proceed in state court.58 The statute granting the federal 
courts subject matter jurisdiction over patent cases, § 1338(a), uses language 
similar to the general federal question statute, giving the district courts original 
jurisdiction over any case “arising under any Act of Congress relating to 
patents.”59 Section 1338(a), however, makes the federal courts’ jurisdiction over 
patent cases exclusive, providing that “[n]o State court shall have jurisdiction 
over any claim for relief arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents.”60 
The Federal Circuit’s jurisdictional statute, § 1295(a)(1), also employs this 
“arising under” language, granting the court exclusive jurisdiction over appeals 
from district courts in any case “arising under” patent law.61  
The courts have interpreted the “arising under” language in all of these 
statutes identically.62 In other words, the analysis of whether a case arises under 
federal law generally or under patent law specifically will, with one minor 
exception involving patent-based counterclaims,63 look the same—the only 
difference will be the consequence of that ruling. If a case arises under federal 
 
 56 568 U.S. 251, 264–65 (2013). 
 57 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012). 
 58 See Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 565 U.S. 368, 378 (2012) (“In cases ‘arising under’ federal law 
… ‘there is a deeply rooted presumption in favor of concurrent state court jurisdiction’....” (quoting Tafflin v. 
Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 459 (1990))). 
 59 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a). 
 60 Id.; see also id. § 1454(a) (permitting removal from state to federal court in any “civil action in which 
any party asserts a claim for relief arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents”). 
 61 Id. § 1295(a)(1).  
 62 See, e.g., Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 257 (2013) (“Adhering to the demands of ‘[l]inguistic 
consistency,’ we have interpreted the phrase ‘arising under’ in both sections identically, applying our § 1331 
and § 1338(a) precedents interchangeably.” (quoting Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 
808 (1988))); Xitronix Corp. v. KLA-Tencor Corp., 882 F.3d 1075, 1079 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“While the parties 
argue Gunn is inapplicable because it concerns district court jurisdiction over state claims, the indistinguishable 
statutory language of §§ 1295 and 1338 requires our careful consideration of Gunn in interpreting our 
jurisdictional statute.”). 
 63 See infra note 64. 
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law generally, the state and federal courts will have concurrent jurisdiction, and 
appellate jurisdiction will lie in the regional circuit encompassing the district 
court. But if a case arises under patent law specifically, federal jurisdiction is 
exclusive, and any appeal will be heard by the Federal Circuit.64 
Supreme Court precedent makes clear that a case can “arise under” federal 
law (either federal law generally or patent law specifically) in two ways. First, a 
case arises under federal law if federal law actually creates the plaintiff’s legal 
claim.65 As the Supreme Court has noted, this first category “accounts for the 
vast bulk of suits that arise under federal law.”66 An example of a case in this 
category is one involving a claim for patent infringement. A federal statute, 35 
U.S.C. § 281, actually gives a patentee the right to file suit in federal court if its 
patent has been infringed.67 Therefore, cases involving claims for patent 
infringement fall within the federal courts’ federal question jurisdiction. Indeed, 
because of § 1338(a), those cases fall within the federal courts’ exclusive subject 
matter jurisdiction and, because of § 1295(a)(1), any appeal will go to the 
Federal Circuit. 
Second, and more controversially, a case can arise under federal law even if 
the plaintiff’s claim is created by state law if that state law claim raises a 
“substantial” issue of federal law.68 The modern origin of this wing of federal 
question jurisdiction is Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., in which the 
Supreme Court upheld federal question jurisdiction over a state law claim 
seeking to stop a bank from investing in bonds issued under a federal statute (the 
 
 64 As noted, there is one minor way in which the jurisdictional analysis under the federal question statute, 
§ 1331, and the patent-specific statute, § 1338(a), differs. That difference involves the so-called well-pleaded 
complaint rule. Under the Supreme Court’s decisions interpreting § 1331 (most famously, Louisville & Nashville 
R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908)), the federal question providing the basis for jurisdiction must appear 
in the plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint, that is, in the plaintiff’s statement of its own claims. Neither federal 
issues raised in defense, nor federal counterclaims, will create federal question jurisdiction. Holmes Grp., Inc. 
v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 831 (2002). In patent cases, by contrast, Congress has 
partially relaxed the well-pleaded complaint rule, providing that patent law counterclaims do, in fact, cause a 
case to arise under patent law. See America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 19(a), 125 Stat. 284, 331 (2011). 
Patent law defenses, however, remain insufficient. 
 65 The classic articulation of this basis for federal question jurisdiction appears in Justice Holmes’s 
opinion in American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916) (“A suit arises under the 
law that creates the cause of action.”). 
 66 Gunn, 568 U.S. at 257. 
 67 See 35 U.S.C. § 281 (2012) (“A patentee shall have remedy by civil action for infringement of his 
patent.”). 
 68 This requirement is sometimes referred to as the “centrality” requirement or the “essential federal 
element” requirement, in the sense that it requires the embedded federal issue to be “central” or “essential” to 
the state law claim being asserted. RICHARD D. FREER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 246 (4th ed. 2017); A. BENJAMIN 
SPENCER, CIVIL PROCEDURE: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 255 (5th ed. 2018). 
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federal Farm Loan Act) because the state law claim turned on whether the 
federal statute violated the U.S. Constitution.69 In what the Supreme Court later 
characterized as “a somewhat generous statement of the scope of” federal 
question jurisdiction over state-created claims,70 the Court in Smith wrote that a 
state-created claim falls within federal question jurisdiction if the plaintiff’s 
“right to relief depends upon the construction or application of” federal law.71 
More recently, the Supreme Court has emphasized that this class of state-
created claims that arise under federal law is “slim.”72 To set the boundaries of 
arising under jurisdiction over state law claims that have federal issues 
embedded within them, the Supreme Court has developed a four-element test: 
“[F]ederal jurisdiction over a state law claim will lie if a federal issue is: (1) 
necessarily raised, (2) actually disputed, (3) substantial, and (4) capable of 
resolution in federal court without disrupting the federal-state balance approved 
by Congress.”73 
Because the class of state law claims within federal question jurisdiction is 
small and sometimes difficult to define,74 many observers have queried whether 
this category should even exist.75 Indeed, after the Supreme Court’s 1986 
decision in Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thomson,76 some lower courts 
and commentators thought the Court had actually limited federal question 
jurisdiction to cases involving claims created by federal law—the first category 
described above.77 The plaintiffs in Merrell Dow asserted state law tort claims 
 
 69 255 U.S. 180, 201–02 (1921). 
 70 Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312–13 (2005). 
 71 Smith, 255 U.S. at 199. 
 72 Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 258 (2013); see also Empire HealthChoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 
547 U.S. 677, 699 (2006) (“special and small category”). 
 73 Gunn, 568 U.S. at 258. 
 74 See, for example, Chief Justice Roberts’s quip about the Jackson Pollock canvas. See also FREER, supra 
note 68, at 246 (noting that the question of whether a state law claim arises under federal law “is a relatively 
amorphous inquiry,” turning on several Supreme Court opinions “that are difficult to reconcile”).  
 75 Justice Thomas, for instance, seems willing to consider abolishing federal question jurisdiction over 
state-created claims. See Grable, 545 U.S. at 321 (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that the “‘vast majority’ of 
cases that come within § 1331 under our current case law” involve claims created by federal law, and that “trying 
to sort out which cases fall within the smaller … category [of state-claims subject to federal question jurisdiction] 
may not be worth the effort it entails” (citations omitted)). But cf. Ann Woolhander & Michael G. Collins, 
Federal Question Jurisdiction and Justice Holmes, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2151, 2153 (2009) (presenting a 
historical study suggesting that, prior to Justice Holmes’s opinion in American Well Works, see supra note 65, 
cases involving state law claims with embedded federal issues “were perhaps the paradigm ‘arising under’ 
cases”). 
 76 478 U.S. 804 (1986). 
 77 See, e.g., 13D WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 13, § 3562 (“[B]y stressing the lack of a federal claim, the 
majority seemed to embrace a notion that federal question jurisdiction exists only for the vindication of federal 
claims; if Congress does not create a claim, it is difficult, under Merrell Dow, to determine when (if ever) a 
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for damages they allegedly suffered when their mothers took the drug Bendectin 
while pregnant.78 One of the plaintiffs’ theories was negligence per se based on 
the defendant’s alleged mislabeling of its drug in violation of the federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA).79 That is, the plaintiffs argued that the 
defendant was liable under state tort law because its drug’s label violated a 
federal statute. But the Supreme Court ruled that federal question jurisdiction 
did not exist, noting, among other things, that Congress could have created a 
federal claim for violations of the FDCA, that Congress chose not to do so, and 
that the Court was “not free to ‘supplement’ that decision in a way that makes 
[Congress’s decision] meaningless.”80  
Two decades later, however, the Supreme Court clarified that certain state-
created claims can, in fact, arise under federal law and create federal question 
jurisdiction. In Grable & Sons Metal Products v. Darue, the IRS had seized land 
owned by Grable to satisfy a federal tax delinquency.81 The IRS sold the land to 
Darue.82 Grable then brought a state law quiet title suit, claiming that Darue’s 
title was invalid because the IRS did not notify Grable of the seizure in the 
manner required by the federal tax statute.83 
The Supreme Court upheld federal jurisdiction over Grable’s state law 
claim.84 It first noted that, over the past century, it had “sh[ied] away from the 
expansive view that mere need to apply federal law in a state-law claim will 
suffice to open the ‘arising under’ door.”85 Rather, the Court viewed its 
precedent as “confin[ing] federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims to 
those [claims] that ‘really and substantially involv[e] a dispute or controversy 
respecting the validity, construction or effect of [federal] law.’”86 
 
claim might arise under federal law.”); Martin H. Redish, Reassessing the Allocation of Judicial Business 
Between State and Federal Courts: Federal Jurisdiction and “The Martian Chronicles”, 78 VA. L. REV. 1769, 
1793 (1992) (suggesting that, after Merrell Dow, “one could reasonably conclude that federal interests are not 
sufficiently implicated to justify the assertion of federal jurisdiction unless the actual cause of action is federal” 
but arguing that “the Court in Merrell Dow adopted no such rule”); Note, Mr. Smith Goes to Federal Court: 
Federal Question Jurisdiction Over State Law Claims Post-Merrell Dow, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2272, 2280–82 
(2002) (discussing a split in the courts of appeals about whether a federal right of action is required to create 
federal question jurisdiction). 
 78 Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 805. 
 79 Id. at 805–06. 
 80 Id. at 812 n.10. 
 81 545 U.S. 308, 310 (2005). 
 82 Id. at 310–11. 
 83 Id. at 311. 
 84 Id. at 314. 
 85 Id. at 313. 
 86 Id. (third and fourth alterations in original) (quoting Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U.S. 561, 569 (1912)). 
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The Court then offered three reasons for upholding federal jurisdiction over 
Grable’s quiet title claim. First, “the meaning of the federal statute,” the notice 
provision of the tax code, was disputed.87 Second, the dispute over the statute’s 
meaning was “an important issue of federal law that sensibly belong[ed] in a 
federal court” because of the government’s interest in vindicating its tax 
collection activity and because federal judges are experienced with tax law.88 
Finally, federal jurisdiction over cases like Grable would not upset any balance 
between federal and state judicial responsibilities because, in the Court’s view, 
“it will be the rare state title case that raises a contested matter of federal law.”89 
One year later, in Empire HealthChoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, the 
Supreme Court rejected federal jurisdiction over a contract claim brought by 
Blue Cross Blue Shield against its insured seeking to recover money the insured 
had received in a tort case against a third party.90 The case potentially presented 
a federal issue because the insured was an employee of the federal government 
and the insurance policy was issued under a master contract between Blue Cross 
and the government.91 The Court, however, noted that the case did not fit the 
“special and small category” of state-law claims that arise under federal law.92 
It distinguished Grable on the ground that “Grable presented a nearly ‘pure issue 
of law,’ one ‘that could be settled once and for all and thereafter would govern 
numerous tax sale cases.’”93 By contrast, the claim in Empire was “fact-bound 
and situation-specific.”94 
Taken together, Merrell Dow, Grable, and Empire make clear that, to justify 
federal question jurisdiction over a claim that is not created by federal law, the 
federal issue must have wider importance than the case at hand. Those decisions 
also hold that arising under jurisdiction does not exist merely because the court 
must apply federal law to decide a state-created claim; rather, the case for federal 
question jurisdiction is much stronger if the claim presents a pure question of 
federal law. 
 
 87 Id. at 315. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. 
 90 547 U.S. 677, 683 (2006). 
 91 Id. at 688–89. 
 92 Id. at 699. 
 93 Id. at 700 (quoting RICHARD H. FALLON ET AL., HART & WECHESLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
FEDERAL SYSTEM 65 (5th ed. 2003 & Supp. 2005)). 
 94 Id. at 700–01. 
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B. “Arising Under” Jurisdiction in Patent Cases 
As I have explained in a prior article, the Federal Circuit mostly disregarded 
the Supreme Court’s rulings in Grable and Empire that case-specific or fact-
specific federal issues are insufficient to make a case arise under federal law for 
jurisdictional purposes.95 Rather, the court held for many years that state law 
claims (or claims created by bodies of federal law besides patent law, such as 
antitrust law) arose under patent law—and therefore fell within the federal 
courts’ and the Federal Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction—if the claims implicated 
issues about the scope or validity of any particular patent.96 The Federal Circuit 
justified this expansive approach to exclusive patent jurisdiction by emphasizing 
both the unique experience of federal judges in deciding patent cases and the 
overarching importance of uniformity in patent law.97 So, for example, the 
Federal Circuit upheld jurisdiction under § 1338 in legal malpractice cases in 
which the court would have to decide how issues of infringement or patentability 
would have turned out but for an attorney’s negligence.98 The court reached the 
same conclusion for other state law tort claims that included embedded issues of 
validity or infringement.99 Similarly, state law breach of contract suits would 
trigger exclusive jurisdiction if the contract claim turned on the validity or scope 
of the licensed patent.100 
The Supreme Court rejected this line of Federal Circuit cases in its 2013 
decision in Gunn v. Minton.101 In that case, the federal courts had held in patent 
infringement litigation that a patent owned by Minton was invalid under the 
 
 95 Gugliuzza, supra note 22, at 1815. 
 96 See generally Bd. of Regents ex rel. Univ. of Tex. v. Nippon Tel. & Tel. Corp., 414 F.3d 1358, 1363 
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (“[T]his court has held that issues of inventorship, infringement, validity and enforceability 
present sufficiently substantial questions of federal patent law to support jurisdiction under section 1338(a).”). 
 97 See, e.g., Immunocept, LLC v. Fulbright & Jaworski, LLP, 504 F.3d 1281, 1285–86 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 
(“Claim scope determination is a question of law that can be complex in that it may involve many claim 
construction doctrines. Litigants will benefit from federal judges who are used to handling these complicated 
rules. Additionally, Congress’ intent to remove non-uniformity in the patent law, as evidenced by its enactment 
of the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 [which created the Federal Circuit], is further indicium that 
§ 1338 jurisdiction is proper here.” (citations omitted)). 
 98 See, e.g., Davis v. Brouse McDowell, L.P.A., 596 F.3d 1355, 1360–62 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (patentability); 
Air Measurement Techs., Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, L.L.P., 504 F.3d 1262, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 
(infringement).  
 99 See, e.g., Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 1998) 
(upholding § 1338 jurisdiction over a state law claim for injurious falsehood where the allegedly false statements 
concerned the validity of a patent); Additive Controls & Measurement Sys., Inc. v. Flowdata, Inc., 986 F.2d 476, 
478 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (upholding § 1338 jurisdiction over a state law claim of business disparagement where the 
allegedly disparaging statement was an accusation of patent infringement). 
 100 See, e.g., U.S. Valves, Inc. v. Dray, 212 F.3d 1368, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 101 568 U.S. 251, 263 (2013). 
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Patent Act’s on-sale bar because Minton leased his invention more than one year 
before filing a patent application.102 Minton then sued his attorneys for 
malpractice in Texas state court, claiming that the attorneys had been negligent 
by not arguing that his patent fell within an exception to the on-sale bar for 
experimental uses.103 The Supreme Court of Texas ordered the case dismissed 
for lack of jurisdiction, relying on the Federal Circuit case law mentioned 
above.104 
But the U.S. Supreme Court reversed, with Chief Justice Roberts’s 
unanimous opinion bluntly stating that “state legal malpractice claims based on 
underlying patent matters will rarely, if ever, arise under federal patent law.”105 
Articulating and applying the four-element test outlined above,106 the Court first 
acknowledged that resolution of a federal issue (whether Minton would have 
won his patent infringement suit but for his attorneys’ negligence) was both 
necessary to and actually disputed within his state-created malpractice claim.107 
The Court, however, found that that federal issue was not “substantial” and 
therefore did not justify arising under jurisdiction. 
The Court emphasized that, to be substantial, a federal issue embedded 
within a state law claim must not merely be “significant to the particular parties 
in the immediate suit”; rather, “[t]he substantiality inquiry under Grable looks 
… to the importance of the issue to the federal system as a whole.”108 As 
examples of embedded federal questions that are substantial, the Court cited 
both Grable, in which the Court had emphasized the federal government’s 
“strong interest” in recovering delinquent taxes and in vindicating its own 
administrative action, and Smith, where the disputed federal question was the 
constitutionality of a statute passed by Congress.109 
In Gunn, by contrast, the patent issue raised by Minton’s malpractice 
claim—“[i]f Minton’s lawyers had raised a timely experimental-use argument, 
would the result in the patent infringement proceeding have been different?”—
was entirely “hypothetical” because Minton’s patent had already been 
 
 102 Minton v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 336 F.3d 1373, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see also 35 U.S.C. 
§ 102(b) (2006) (on-sale bar). 
 103 Gunn, 568 U.S. at 255. On the experimental use exception, see generally City of Elizabeth v. Pavement 
Co., 97 U.S. 126, 136 (1877). 
 104 Gunn, 568 U.S. at 256 (citing Air Measurement Techs., Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, 
L.L.P., 504 F.3d 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Immunocept, LLC v. Fulbright & Jaworski, LLP, 504 F.3d 1281 (2007)). 
 105 Id. at 258.  
 106 See supra text accompanying note 73. 
 107 Gunn, 568 U.S. at 259. 
 108 Id. at 260. 
 109 Id. at 260–61. 
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invalidated in “real-world” infringement litigation.110 In addition, the Court 
rejected Minton’s argument that the preclusive effects of a state court ruling on 
a patent issue justified exclusive federal jurisdiction, emphasizing that “the 
result would be limited to the parties and patents that had been before the state 
court.”111 “Such ‘fact-bound and situation-specific effects,’” the Court 
explained, “are not sufficient to establish federal arising under jurisdiction.”112 
II. RISING CONFUSION ABOUT “ARISING UNDER” JURISDICTION IN 
PATENT CASES 
The Supreme Court in Gunn appeared to articulate a relatively clear rule 
about when a claim that is not created by federal patent law nevertheless arises 
under patent law for jurisdictional purposes: The mere need to apply federal 
patent law is not sufficient; rather, resolution of the patent issue must have 
significant consequences for more than just the parties or the patents involved in 
the case.113 Yet the Federal Circuit has struggled to implement the Supreme 
Court’s holding. As this Part explains, the Federal Circuit initially tried to limit 
Gunn to its precise facts, finding no jurisdiction only when the relevant patent 
had already been invalidated or had expired. More recent Federal Circuit 
decisions reach results more faithful to the Supreme Court’s holding in Gunn, 
but they contain reasoning that is problematic in other ways. This Part critiques 
the Federal Circuit’s post-Gunn case law and examines some consequences of 
the rising confusion about arising under jurisdiction in patent cases. 
A. Undermining the Supreme Court 
The Federal Circuit began softening the impact of Gunn in its very first post-
Gunn ruling on subject matter jurisdiction, Forrester Environmental Services, 
Inc. v. Wheelabrator Technologies, Inc.114 That case, which the Federal Circuit 
decided less than three months after Gunn, involved state law tort claims based 
on allegedly false accusations of patent infringement.115 The Federal Circuit 
ultimately held that federal jurisdiction did not exist because the accusations 
concerned conduct that took place entirely in Taiwan, where the relevant U.S. 
 
 110 Id. at 261. 
 111 Id. at 263. 
 112 Id. (quoting Empire HealthChoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 701 (2006)). 
 113 See, e.g., id. at 263–64 (ruling that federal jurisdiction did not exist because the effects of the case 
“would be limited to the parties and patents that [were] before the … court” and would not create “binding 
precedent for any future patent claim”). 
 114 715 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
 115 Id. at 1332. 
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patents could not possibly be infringed.116 Nevertheless, the court, in an opinion 
by Judge Dyk, used the opportunity to pen dicta distinguishing Gunn from its 
older case law. The court discussed several pre-Gunn (indeed, pre-Grable) 
Federal Circuit decisions upholding jurisdiction over state law tort claims that 
contained embedded issues of patent validity or infringement117 and observed 
that those decisions “may well have survived the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Gunn.”118 The Federal Circuit elaborated:  
Unlike the purely “backward-looking” legal malpractice claim in 
Gunn, permitting state courts to adjudicate disparagement cases (in-
volving alleged false statements about U.S. patent rights) could result 
in inconsistent judgments between state and federal courts. For exam-
ple, a federal court could conclude that certain conduct constituted in-
fringement of a patent while a state court addressing the same infringe-
ment question could conclude that the accusation of infringement was 
false and the patentee could be enjoined from making future public 
claims about the full scope of its patent as construed in federal court.119  
The Federal Circuit’s reasoning in this passage both misunderstands how the 
law of issue preclusion operates and is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Gunn. In terms of preclusion, the Federal Circuit’s opinion 
significantly overstates the possibility of inconsistent rulings if state courts were 
to adjudicate tort claims involving false accusations of patent infringement. 
Contrary to what the Federal Circuit’s opinion suggests, a federal court’s finding 
of infringement (or, for that matter, any other finding made by the federal court) 
would prevent the parties from relitigating that same issue in state court. Under 
the doctrine of issue preclusion, the parties to a case are prohibited from 
relitigating any issue decided in that case. The preclusive effect of federal court 
rulings in federal question cases is determined by federal law,120 and federal 
preclusion law would plainly prohibit relitigation of the same issue of 
infringement or validity between the same parties,121 including in a later state 
law tort case.122 
 
 116 Id. at 1334–35. 
 117 Id. at 1334 (citing Additive Controls & Measurement Sys., Inc. v. Flowdata, Inc., 986 F.2d 476, 478 
(Fed. Cir. 1993); Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318, 1329–31 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id. (citation omitted). 
 120 Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 891 (2008). 
 121 Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA, Inc., 617 F.3d 1296, 1311–
12 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 122 Though there is little case law on the specific question of the preclusive effect of federal patent rulings 
in later state court litigation, “it is clear that federal judgments must be afforded full faith and credit by the state 
courts.” Developments in the Law—Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1330, 1357 n.129 (1977) 
(citing Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 172 (1938)). 
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The converse is also true. If a state court first ruled that an allegation of 
infringement was false, that ruling would almost certainly prevent the same 
parties from relitigating the infringement issue in subsequent federal 
litigation.123 Though it might seem odd at first glance to give a state court the 
first—and last—word on an issue of federal patent law, it is not at all unusual 
for federal courts to grant preclusive effect to state court judgments on matters 
of federal law more generally.124 
Even if preclusion law would not prevent conflicting judgments between 
state and federal courts in patent-related state law cases (which, as I have just 
argued, it generally does), the Forrester opinion still flouted the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Gunn by suggesting that case-specific concerns about 
inconsistent rulings would justify exclusive federal jurisdiction. As the Supreme 
Court instructed, in determining whether a federal issue embedded within a 
state-created claim is “substantial,” courts should not “focus[] on the importance 
of the issue to the plaintiff’s case and to the parties before it” because the federal 
issue will always be significant to the parties.125 Rather, the Court instructed, 
“[t]he substantiality inquiry … looks … to the importance of the issue to the 
federal system as a whole.”126 It is simply not clear how different rulings about 
the validity or infringement of one particular patent could meet that standard. As 
the Supreme Court noted in finding federal jurisdiction lacking in Gunn, the 
effect of any ruling on the validity of Minton’s patent would have been “limited 
to the parties and patents that [were] before the state court.”127  
Despite these flaws in the Forrester dicta, the Federal Circuit, in its next 
encounter with subject matter jurisdiction, squarely held that case- and party-
 
 123 Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96 (1980) (“Congress has specifically required all federal courts to 
give preclusive effect to state-court judgments whenever the courts of the State from which the judgments 
emerged would do so….”) (citing the full faith and credit statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738). 
 124 See, e.g., Kremer v. Chem. Const. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 485 (1982) (holding that a state court judgment 
affirming the denial of a federal Title VII claim precluded the claimant from bringing a federal lawsuit to 
relitigate the liability determination). 
 125 Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 260 (2013). 
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. at 263. Though the Supreme Court has often touted the public interest in policing the scope and 
validity of issued patents, see, e.g., Blonder-Tongue Lab., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 343 (1971), 
that societal interest in “full and free competition in the use of ideas,” Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670 
(1969), is not the same as the federal interest needed to trigger jurisdiction under cases such as Grable. The 
public interest in reviewing patent validity or scope could be vindicated even if the federal courts did not exist 
or did not have jurisdiction over patent cases. See generally Gugliuzza, supra note 47, at 69–71 (weighing the 
costs and benefits of repealing the federal courts’ exclusive jurisdiction over patent cases). Jurisdiction-
triggering federal interests typically arise in disputes about the constitutionality or meaning of federal law, or in 
challenges to the legality of the federal government’s own actions, as the Grable and Gunn cases themselves 
illustrate. 
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specific issues of patent infringement and validity are sufficient for a case to 
arise under federal patent law. In Jang v. Boston Scientific Corp., the plaintiff 
filed a breach of contract suit in federal court seeking to recover unpaid royalties 
under a patent licensing agreement.128 The district court denied the defendants’ 
motion for summary judgment on the merits of the claim but gave the defendants 
permission to seek interlocutory review under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).129 On 
appeal, the Federal Circuit, before addressing the defendants’ § 1292(b) request 
(which it ultimately denied),130 first confronted the issue of jurisdiction. Because 
the case indisputably qualified for diversity jurisdiction, the question before the 
Federal Circuit was not whether the case could proceed in federal court at all 
(which was the question in both Gunn and Forrester), it was whether the Federal 
Circuit should decide the case or whether the case should be transferred to the 
relevant regional circuit (in Jang, the Ninth Circuit).131 Recall, however, that the 
Federal Circuit’s jurisdictional statute (§ 1295(a)(1)) and the statute conferring 
exclusive jurisdiction on the district courts (§ 1338(a)) ask precisely the same 
question: Does the case “arise under” patent law?132  
The Federal Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Linn, distinguished Gunn and 
held that it did, in fact, have jurisdiction over the Jang case. Unlike in Gunn, the 
court asserted, “the disputed federal patent law issues presented … are 
substantial and neither entirely backward-looking nor hypothetical.”133 These 
patent issues, according to the court, included not only the question of 
infringement (that is, whether the defendants were selling products covered by 
Jang’s patents without paying royalties) but also validity, as the licensing 
contract required the defendants to pay royalties only on products covered by 
“valid” claims of the licensed patents.134 In Jang, unlike in Gunn, the relevant 
patents were apparently still enforceable,135 and, in upholding jurisdiction, the 
 
 128 767 F.3d 1334, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 129 Id. at 1336. Section 1292(b) allows a district judge, when entering an order that is not otherwise 
appealable, to authorize the parties to seek interlocutory review if the order “involves a controlling question of 
law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion” and “an immediate appeal … may 
materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2012). The court of appeals 
has discretion as to whether or not to allow an appeal to proceed. Id. 
 130 Jang, 767 F.3d at 1339. 
 131 See id. at 1335. 
 132 28 U.S.C. §§ 1295(a)(1), 1338(a) (2012). 
 133 Jang, 767 F.3d at 1337. 
 134 Id. 
 135 In reality, by the time of the Federal Circuit’s opinion, the patents had been canceled in reexamination 
proceedings at the Patent Office. See id. at 1338. But the Federal Circuit treated the patents as if they were still 
in force for jurisdictional purposes because (1) issues of infringement or validity could still be raised in 
subsequent suits to recover unpaid royalties for the time period before the patents were canceled, see id. at 1337–
38, and (2) the court viewed subject matter jurisdiction as properly determined “on the facts as they existed at 
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Federal Circuit put significant emphasis on how the court’s ruling in the breach 
of contract case might impact “subsequently arising infringement suits affecting 
other parties.”136 Repeating the dicta from Forrester that I quoted above, the 
Federal Circuit stressed the “potential of conflicting rulings particularly as to 
validity” between a regional circuit and the Federal Circuit should the breach of 
contract case not be appealed to the Federal Circuit.137 This potential for 
“inconsistent judgments,” the court explained, would affect “not only the parties 
to this dispute but other parties who might be sued in separate actions for 
infringement.”138 Accordingly, the court concluded, “[m]aintaining Federal 
Circuit jurisdiction over … contractual disputes to avoid such conflicting rulings 
is important to ‘the federal system as a whole’ and not merely ‘to the particular 
parties in the immediate suit.’”139  
Like the dicta in Forrester, the holding in Jang evidences misunderstanding 
of the law of preclusion and ignores the Supreme Court’s holding in Gunn that 
case- and fact-specific issues are insufficient to trigger arising under jurisdiction. 
In terms of preclusion, it is easiest to understand the Federal Circuit’s mistake 
by considering the four possible ways in which the court hearing the breach of 
contract suit might resolve the embedded issues of patent infringement or 
validity (or both). In each circumstance, the Federal Circuit’s assertion that 
exclusive federal and Federal Circuit jurisdiction is needed to prevent conflicting 
outcomes is either (a) wrong because preclusion law would prevent conflicting 
outcomes regardless of which court decided the case or, (b) to the extent 
preclusion law would not prevent conflicting outcomes, exaggerates the degree 
to which exclusive federal and Federal Circuit jurisdiction could do that work 
instead. 
The first outcome the court hearing the breach of contract suit could reach is 
that the patent is invalid (meaning that the defendant does not owe royalties 
under the contract). It is black-letter law (dating back to the Supreme Court’s 
seminal decision in Blonder-Tongue140) that a ruling of patent invalidity may be 
invoked defensively to avoid liability by anyone accused in the future of 
infringing that patent, regardless of whether that accused infringer was a party 
to the original suit. Importantly, that would not change simply because the issue 
 
the time the claim was filed,” id. at 1338 (citing Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Grp., L.P., 541 U.S. 567 (2004) 
(a diversity case involving post-filing changes in citizenship)). 
 136 Id. at 1337. 
 137 See id. at 1338. 
 138 Id. 
 139 Id. (quoting Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 260 (2013)). 
 140 Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 350 (1971). 
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of patent validity was decided in the context of a breach of contract claim rather 
than as a defense to an infringement claim. Under the federal law of issue 
preclusion, defendants have a broad ability to rely on rulings from a prior case 
against a party who litigated and lost that prior case. The relevant doctrine 
requires only that the two cases present the same issue and that that issue was 
actually litigated and necessarily decided in the prior case.141 A ruling that no 
breach of contract occurred because the licensed patent is invalid plainly meets 
those requirements. Thus, contrary to the Federal Circuit’s suggestion, there is 
no danger of conflicting rulings when the court hearing the breach of contract 
case holds that the patent is invalid: that invalidity ruling will, under Blonder-
Tongue, control the result in any future infringement litigation, regardless of 
which court decides the breach of contract case.142  
Second, the court hearing the breach of contract case could conclude that the 
patent is not invalid (meaning that the defendant does owe royalties if its 
products do, in fact, infringe—the fourth possibility discussed below). In the 
circumstance in which the court hearing the contract case rejects the defendant’s 
assertion of invalidity, it is possible that a court hearing a future infringement 
 
 141 Levi Strauss & Co. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co., 719 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
 142 The only possible exception is if the court hearing the breach of contract case is a state court in the 
small minority of states that have not followed Blonder-Tongue’s relaxation of the mutuality requirement for the 
defensive use of issue preclusion. See, e.g., Jones v. Blanton, 644 So. 2d 882, 886 (Ala. 1994); E.C. v. Katz, 731 
So. 2d 1268, 1269–70 (Fla. 1999) (per curiam); Lichon v. Am. Universal Ins. Co., 459 N.W.2d 288, 298 (Mich. 
1990); Hofsommer v. Hofsommer Excavating, Inc., 488 N.W.2d 380, 385–86 (N.D. 1992); see also Farred v. 
Hicks, 915 F.2d 1530, 1533 (11th Cir. 1990) (applying Georgia law). Also, it is possible that the Patent Office 
might not treat a state court invalidity ruling as preclusive in post-issuance proceedings to review patent validity. 
Cf. Gunn, 568 U.S. at 263 (noting that “[t]he Patent and Trademark Office Manual of Patent Examining 
Procedure provides that res judicata is a proper ground for rejecting a patent ‘only when the earlier decision was 
a decision of the Board of Appeals’ or certain federal reviewing courts, giving no indication that state court 
decisions would have preclusive effect” (citing MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 706.03(w) (8th 
ed. Aug. 2012 rev.))). But the legal basis for the Patent Office ignoring a final state court judgment finding a 
patent to be invalid would be far from clear. Cf. Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422, 1429 (Fed. Cir. 1988) 
(“[I]f a court finds a patent invalid, and that decision is either upheld on appeal or not appealed, the PTO may 
discontinue its reexamination…. [I]t is admissible for the PTO to act on [a] standing judgment of invalidity 
unless and until a court has said it does not have res judicata effect.”). In an opinion issued as this Article was 
going to press, the Federal Circuit suggested that it, too, might refuse to follow a state court decision finding that 
a patent does not meet the validity requirements set by federal law. In Inspired Development Group, LLC v. 
Inspired Products Group, LLC, 938 F.3d 1355, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2019), the court—in tension with Forrester and 
Jang—declined jurisdiction over a state law case containing an embedded issue of patent validity because it 
viewed “[t]he risk of” conflicting state-federal rulings on patent validity to be “remote,” noting that “a state court 
cannot invalidate patents.” But federal courts, contrary to what the Federal Circuit seems to be implying, do not 
“invalidate” patents, either. Rather, their judgments finding that patents do not meet validity requirements are 
given defensive, non-mutual preclusive effect in future litigation under Blonder-Tongue. Importantly, the 
relevant state and federal laws of preclusion are relatively similar, meaning that a state court judgment finding 
that a patent does not meet validity requirements ought to be given preclusive effect in a federal court. See supra 
notes 123-124. 
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dispute could reach a different result and hold the patent to be invalid. Unlike an 
accused infringer, who may invoke a prior ruling of invalidity defensively under 
Blonder-Tongue even if they were not a party to the prior case, a patentee may 
not offensively rely on a ruling finding its patent not invalid to preclude future 
litigation of validity by parties who were not involved in the prior dispute.143 
This is because due process principles strictly limit the use of preclusion against 
litigants who were not parties to a prior case.144  
Importantly, however, this possibility of different validity rulings is in no 
way unique to cases involving state law claims (or non-patent federal claims, 
such as antitrust claims) with patent validity issues embedded in them. Rather, 
it exists any time a patentee sues multiple defendants seriatim. Indeed, the 
Federal Circuit itself has approved of different rulings on the validity of a single 
patent in serial infringement suits, reasoning that different courts can properly 
reach different results because of different evidentiary records and different prior 
art references presented in different cases.145  
Moreover, when the Federal Circuit in Jang wrote of the possibility of 
“conflicting” rulings on patent validity,146 it was arguably overstating matters. 
As the Federal Circuit itself has recognized: 
[A] prior holding of validity is not necessarily inconsistent with [a] 
subsequent holding of invalidity. In one action, the defendants did not 
overcome the statutory presumption of validity; in the other they did. 
The difference in result could be attributable to many neutral facts: 
e.g., different prior art references or different records. It cannot always 
be said that of two “inconsistent” determinations, one is correct and 
one is incorrect.147 
Thus, whether or not exclusive federal (or Federal Circuit) jurisdiction exists 
over breach of contract cases like Jang, the possibility of different rulings on the 
validity of a single patent will remain when the first court to pass on the issue 
finds that the patent is not invalid. 
Third, the court hearing the breach of contract claim could conclude that the 
defendant does not infringe the patent (that is, that the products the defendant is 
 
 143 See In re Constr. Equip. Co., 665 F.3d 1254, 1256 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 144 Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892–93 (2008).  
 145 See, e.g., Shelcore, Inc. v. Durham Indus., Inc., 745 F.2d 621, 627 (Fed. Cir. 1984); see also Allen 
Archery, Inc. v. Browning Mfg. Co., 819 F.2d 1087, 1091 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“[W]e shall review the district 
court’s conclusion on validity in this case independently” despite a prior judgment upholding validity). 
 146 Jang v. Bos. Sci. Corp., 767 F.3d 1334, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 147 Stevenson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 713 F.2d 705, 710 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
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selling are not covered by the plaintiff’s patent and hence do not trigger any 
contractual obligation to pay royalties). In that circumstance, there is no danger 
of conflicting rulings between the same parties because the doctrine of issue 
preclusion would plainly prohibit the parties from relitigating the same issue of 
infringement in a subsequent suit.148 And despite a finding of noninfringement 
in the first, breach of contract, case, the patentee will be allowed to file future 
infringement suits against different defendants. The patentee could succeed in 
those later suits, but that result would be unremarkable. In most circumstances, 
the new defendant’s accused product or process will differ from the original 
defendant’s and will therefore present unique factual questions that would 
justify a different outcome.  
Finally, the court hearing the breach of contract suit could conclude that the 
patent is not invalid and that the defendant does infringe it. In that circumstance, 
too, exclusive jurisdiction would do nothing to reduce the danger of divergent 
results. The patentee would, as usual, be free to file future infringement suits 
against different accused infringers. And any subsequent accused infringer 
would have a due process right to litigate the issue of validity for itself.149 None 
of that changes based on whether the first, breach of contract, suit is litigated in 
state or federal court or is appealed to the Federal Circuit or one of the regional 
circuits. 
Moreover, even if exclusive jurisdiction would help ensure consistent 
rulings from one case to another, as the court in Jang (wrongly) asserted,150 that 
is a case-specific, patent-specific, and party-specific consistency that the 
Supreme Court in Gunn indicated was insufficient to trigger arising under 
jurisdiction.151 In a case like Jang, there is no danger that different courts will 
“undermine the ‘development of a uniform body of [patent] law.’”152 The key 
issues in determining whether the defendants breached the licensing contract 
involve the validity and scope of particular patents. Those issues are a far cry 
from the embedded questions of federal law that justified jurisdiction in Smith 
(was the federal Farm Loan Act constitutional?)153 and Grable (what does the 
federal tax code mean when it requires the government to give a taxpayer 
 
 148 See supra notes 120–24 and accompanying text. 
 149 See supra note 144. 
 150 Jang, 767 F.3d at 1338.  
 151 See Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 263–64 (2013). 
 152 Id. at 261 (quoting Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 162 (1989)) (alteration 
in original) (emphasis added). 
 153 Smith v. Kan. City Title Co., 255 U.S. 180, 195 (1921). 
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“notice” of its seizure of the taxpayer’s property?).154 Indeed, as the Supreme 
Court instructed in Grable, its recent precedent has confined arising under 
jurisdiction over state law claims to those that “really and substantially involv[e] 
a dispute or controversy respecting the validity, construction or effect of 
[federal] law.”155 
Despite these flaws, the Federal Circuit has continued to reassert its holding 
in Jang that case-specific issues of patent infringement or validity trigger arising 
under jurisdiction any time the relevant patents might be asserted in future 
infringement litigation (unlike in Gunn where the relevant patent had already 
been invalidated). Most notably, in Maxchief Investments Ltd. v. Wok & Pan, 
Ind., Inc., the Federal Circuit affirmed a district court’s dismissal of a state law 
tortious interference claim for lack of personal jurisdiction but suggested in dicta 
that exclusive federal subject matter jurisdiction probably existed.156 The court, 
in another opinion by Judge Dyk (the author of Forrester, which also contained 
questionable dicta about the scope of the federal courts’ and the Federal Circuit’s 
jurisdiction over patent cases post-Gunn), reasoned that, because the plaintiff 
alleged that the defendant had engaged in “unfounded” patent infringement 
litigation, the plaintiff would have to prove noninfringment or invalidity of the 
defendant’s patents to succeed on its state law claim.157 A state court ruling on 
those (case-specific) issues, the Federal Circuit (incorrectly) claimed, raised the 
“potential for ‘inconsistent judgments between state and federal courts,’” 
justifying jurisdiction under § 1338(a).158 
B. Confusion and Its Consequences 
Most observers outside the sometimes-hermetic sphere of patent law would 
probably be surprised to learn about the expansive conception of arising under 
jurisdiction espoused by the Federal Circuit in Forrester, Jang, and Maxchief. 
In fact, the leading textbook on the law of federal jurisdiction presumes that, in 
a case like Jang that involves a claim for breach of a patent license agreement, 
precisely the opposite result will prevail. The authors do not mention Jang, but 
they offer the following example that parallels the facts of that case, and they 
 
 154 Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue, 545 U.S. 308, 310–11 (2005); see also 26 U.S.C. § 6335(a) 
(2012) (notice requirement). 
 155 Grable, 545 U.S. at 313 (quoting Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U.S. 561, 569 (1912)) (alteration in 
original) (emphasis added). 
 156 909 F.3d 1134, 1140 & n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 157 Id. 
 158 Id. (quoting Forrester Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. Wheelabrator Techs., Inc., 715 F.3d 1329, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 
2013)). 
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conclude—contrary to the Federal Circuit—that arising under jurisdiction would 
not exist: 
Suppose … that a plaintiff sues a non-diverse party for breach of the 
defendant’s promise to pay royalties in exchange for a patent license; 
the defendant concedes the failure to pay but defends on the ground 
that the patent is invalid and as a result the promise is unenforceable. 
Although the case will turn exclusively on the federal issue of patent 
validity, that issue will be litigated entirely in state court.159 
In fact, the Federal Circuit’s holding that case-specific issues of patent 
infringement or validity cause a case to arise under patent law conflicts not just 
with the views of leading commentators, it conflicts with both regional circuit 
case law and subsequent decisions by the Federal Circuit itself.  
As for regional circuit case law, the Federal Circuit’s suggestion that, even 
after Gunn, embedded issues of patent infringement or validity can create arising 
under jurisdiction is most clearly in tension with the Eleventh Circuit’s decision 
in MDS (Canada) Inc. v. RAD Source Technologies, Inc.160 That case, which 
was decided after Gunn but before Jang,161 involved claims that the defendant 
had breached a contract that prohibited it from developing technology that was 
“embodie[d], in whole or in part,” in certain patents.162 Thus, to succeed on its 
breach of contract claim, the plaintiff had to prove that the defendant infringed 
the patents.163 The Eleventh Circuit found this question of patent law insufficient 
to warrant Federal Circuit jurisdiction on appeal164 because patent infringement 
is a question that is “heavily ‘fact-bound and situation-specific.’”165 Because of 
the “highly specialized nature of patent claims and the niche market for” the 
technology at issue, the Eleventh Circuit observed, resolution of this issue of 
infringement was unlikely to affect any future cases.166 Distinguishing Grable 
and the importance to the federal government of having its tax collection 
activities vindicated by a federal court, the Eleventh Circuit noted that “the 
government interest in any particular fact-bound question of patent infringement 
is less significant than the government interest in a question of law that will 
 
 159 RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL 
SYSTEM 812 (7th ed. 2015) (emphasis added). 
 160 720 F.3d 833 (11th Cir. 2013). 
 161 Though the cases present similar facts, the Federal Circuit’s opinion in Jang did not mention the 
Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in MDS, perhaps because the two opinions are difficult to reconcile, as I explain here. 
 162 Id. at 841. 
 163 Id. at 841–42. 
 164 Id. at 843. The district court indisputably had jurisdiction under the diversity statute. Id. at 841. 
 165 Id. at 842 (quoting Empire HealthChoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 700–01 (2006)). 
 166 Id.  
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impact the ability of the government to raise revenue in a number of future 
cases.”167 Lastly, the Eleventh Circuit noted that finding that the breach of 
contract case arose under patent law because it implicated issues of patent 
infringement would “upset the ‘congressionally approved balance of federal and 
state judicial responsibilities.’ To hold that all questions of patent infringement 
are substantial questions of federal law for the purposes of federal patent 
jurisdiction would sweep a number of state-law claims into federal court.”168  
The only possible distinction between MDS and the Federal Circuit’s 
decisions in Forrester, Jang, and Maxchief is that, in MDS, one of the relevant 
patents had expired because the patentee failed to pay maintenance fees.169 But 
other licensed patents in MDS remained in force.170 Moreover, for reasons I have 
already explained, an interpretation of Gunn that finds jurisdiction lacking only 
when the underlying patent has already been invalidated or expired or is no 
longer enforceable is flawed because it puts too much weight on the significance 
of the case to parties at hand and it ignores the lack of significance of the case 
to the federal system as a whole.171  
Separate and apart from the potential inconsistency of Federal Circuit law 
with regional circuit law, Federal Circuit law on arising under jurisdiction is now 
internally inconsistent. In its most recent significant encounter with issues of 
subject matter jurisdiction, the Federal Circuit held, in contrast to Jang and the 
other cases discussed above, that a case-specific issue of patent validity was not 
sufficient to make a federal antitrust claim arise under patent law.  
In that case, Xitronix Corp. v. KLA-Tencor Corp., the plaintiff’s complaint, 
filed in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas, asserted a single 
claim: that the defendant violated federal antitrust law by filing suit for 
infringement of a patent it had obtained through fraud on the Patent Office.172 
The Supreme Court, in its seminal 1965 decision in Walker Process Equipment, 
Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Co., held that enforcing a patent obtained 
via fraud violates the federal antitrust laws, provided the plaintiff can prove the 
 
 167 Id.  
 168 Id. at 843 (internal citations omitted).  
 169 Id. at 840; see also Xitronix Corp. v. KLA-Tencor Corp., 892 F.3d 1194, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2018) 
(Newman, J., dissenting from the denial of the petition for rehearing en banc) (characterizing MDS as having 
ruled that “the question of infringement was not substantial because the patent had expired”). 
 170 See MDS (Can.), Inc. v. Rad Source Techs., Inc., 822 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1312–13 (S.D. Fla. 2011) 
(determining that the licensor’s failure to pay maintenance fees was not a material breach of the licensing 
agreement because another one of the licensed patents “provide[d] sufficient protection for the blood irradiation 
technology” manufactured by the licensee).  
 171 See supra Part II.A. 
 172 882 F.3d 1075, 1078, 1077 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3526232
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3361240 
GUGLIUZZAPROOFS_12.5.19 12/9/2019 12:01 PM 
488 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:459 
other elements of an antitrust claim, such as the defendant’s monopoly power in 
a relevant market.173 The federal district court in Xitronix granted the 
defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the Walker Process claim, ruling 
that the plaintiff failed to raise a genuine factual dispute both about whether the 
defendant had defrauded the Patent Office and whether any misrepresentations 
had caused the Patent Office to issue the patent.174 
The defendant appealed to the Federal Circuit, but the Federal Circuit 
transferred the case to the Fifth Circuit, concluding that the plaintiff’s Walker 
Process claim did not raise a “substantial” question of patent law under Gunn.175 
The Federal Circuit offered three main reasons for finding a lack of 
substantiality, but all of those reasons are problematic in light of the court’s prior 
precedent (Jang, most notably) and the reality of what litigation of a Walker 
Process claim entails. 
The first reason the court gave for finding that the patent issues in Xitronix 
were not substantial was that, although the Walker Process claim turned on 
whether the defendant had made false statements to the Patent Office, “[t]here 
is nothing unique to patent law about allegations of false statements.”176 Yet 
whether a case presents issues “unique to patent law” is, quite simply, not the 
test for determining whether a case arises under patent law for jurisdictional 
purposes.177 The question of whether an issue is unique to patent law is, instead, 
one formulation of the test the Federal Circuit has used to make choice of law 
rulings—specifically, to determine whether an issue of non-patent law (such as 
a procedural question or a question of substantive law outside the field of patent 
law) should be governed by Federal Circuit precedent or by the precedent of the 
regional circuit encompassing the district court.178 But just because Federal 
Circuit law does not apply to a particular issue does not mean that the Federal 
Circuit lacks jurisdiction over the case. Indeed, many issues that frequently arise 
in cases over which the Federal Circuit indisputably has jurisdiction are—to the 
 
 173 382 U.S. 172, 176–77 (1965). 
 174 Xitronix Corp. v. KLA-Tencor Corp., No. A-14-CA-01113-SS, 2016 WL 7626575, at *9 (W.D. Tex. 
Aug. 26, 2016). 
 175 Xitronix, 882 F.3d at 1078, 1080. 
 176 Id. at 1077. 
 177 Oddly, just a paragraph earlier, the court had correctly recited the jurisdictional standard by asking 
whether the Walker Process claim “necessarily depends on the resolution of a substantial question of federal 
patent law.” Id. (quoting Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 809 (1988)). 
 178 See, e.g., Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1574–75 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (per 
curiam) (“We, therefore, rule, as a matter of policy, that the Federal Circuit shall review procedural matters, that 
are not unique to patent issues, under the law of the particular regional circuit court where appeals from the 
district court would normally lie.”). 
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chagrin of many observers179—not actually governed by Federal Circuit law.180 
Thus, whether or not issues of fraud on the Patent Office are “unique” to patent 
law does not answer the question of which court—state or federal, or, as in 
Xitronix, the Federal Circuit or a regional circuit—has jurisdiction.181 
The second reason the Federal Circuit gave in Xitronix for finding a lack of 
substantiality was the case-specific nature of the patent questions raised.182 After 
asserting that the allegations of fraud were not “unique to patent law,” the court 
acknowledged that determining whether the defendant made misrepresentations 
to the Patent Office “will almost certainly require some application of patent 
law.”183 For instance, analyzing whether fraud occurred “may require analysis 
of the [patent’s] claims and specifications and may require application of patent 
claim construction principles.”184 Though the Federal Circuit did not mention it, 
a Walker Process claim also requires the court to determine the effect that any 
misrepresentations had on the patent examiner, as the Supreme Court’s Walker 
Process decision requires the plaintiff to prove that the defendant’s 
misrepresentations caused the Patent Office to issue the patent.185  
In any event, the Federal Circuit in Xitronix wrote that jurisdiction was 
lacking because the Supreme Court in Gunn required “something more” than 
“mere resolution of a patent issue in a ‘case within a case’” to trigger arising 
under jurisdiction.186 As my analysis above suggests, this interpretation of Gunn 
is correct. A case-specific, patent-specific analysis of claim scope or 
infringement, or of how specific misrepresentations affected an examiner’s 
 
 179 See, e.g., Peter S. Menell, API Copyrightability Bleak House: Unraveling and Repairing the Oracle v. 
Google Jurisdictional Mess, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1515, 1577 (2016) (describing problems that have 
occurred because the Federal Circuit applies regional circuit law to copyright issues); Joan E. Schaffner, Federal 
Circuit “Choice of Law”: Erie Through the Looking Glass, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1173, 1178 (1996) (arguing that 
the Federal Circuit’s reticence to apply its own law to nonpatent substantive issues “inhibits the court’s ability 
to provide uniform guidance to patent policy and the patent-related business activities of litigants”). 
 180 See Ted L. Field, Improving the Federal Circuit’s Approach to Choice of Law for Procedural Matters 
in Patent Cases, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 643, 653–68 (2009) (also noting inconsistencies in the Federal Circuit’s 
choice-of-law precedent). 
 181 Moreover, and in any event, Federal Circuit precedent clearly holds that the fraud element of a Walker 
Process claim is an issue unique to patent cases and is therefore governed by Federal Circuit precedent. See 
Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1067–68 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc in relevant 
part) (“Whether conduct in the prosecution of a patent is sufficient to strip a patentee of its immunity from the 
antitrust laws is one of those issues that clearly involves our exclusive jurisdiction over patent cases…. Because 
most cases involving these issues will therefore be appealed to this court, we conclude that we should decide 
these issues as a matter of Federal Circuit law, rather than rely on various regional precedents.”). 
 182 Xitronix, 882 F.3d at 1078. 
 183 Id. at 1077–78. 
 184 Id. at 1078. 
 185 See Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 174 (1965). 
 186 Xitronix, 882 F.3d at 1078 (citations omitted). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3526232
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3361240 
GUGLIUZZAPROOFS_12.5.19 12/9/2019 12:01 PM 
490 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:459 
analysis of patentability, are not sufficient to create arising under jurisdiction, 
even in a case like Xitronix in which the patent might still be enforced in the 
future. But the Federal Circuit’s reasoning in Xitronix is inconsistent with the 
court’s prior decision in Jang, which held that issues of patent infringement or 
validity embedded within a state law breach of contract claim were sufficient to 
make a case arise under patent law for jurisdictional purposes.187 
The final reason the Federal Circuit gave for finding a lack of substantiality 
in Xitronix—in a possible effort to distinguish Jang—was that the Xitronix case 
presented “no dispute over the validity” of the plaintiff’s patent.188 But Xitronix 
did effectively involve a question of patent validity. A finding in the antitrust 
litigation that the defendant had obtained its patent through fraud on the Patent 
Office would almost certainly cause the patent to be found unenforceable in any 
future infringement litigation under patent law’s doctrine of inequitable conduct, 
which prohibits a patentee from enforcing a patent that it obtained through 
intentional misrepresentations to the Patent Office.189 As the Fifth Circuit 
observed in a subsequent appeal in the Xitronix litigation: “[I]f this litigation 
determines that the [defendant/patentee] defrauded the PTO in obtaining the … 
patent, collateral estoppel principles would furnish a readymade inequitable 
conduct defense to any potential infringer whom [the patentee] might sue.”190 
Though inequitable conduct is technically a ground of patent unenforceability, 
not validity, the salient point is that a finding of fraud in the Walker Process case 
would give rise to a near-locktight inequitable conduct defense, which would 
bar a future infringement claim—just like a ruling of patent invalidity would 
under Blonder-Tongue. So, contrary to the Federal Circuit’s assertion, the 
validity of the patent effectively was at issue in Xitronix, again making the case 
indistinguishable from—and in conflict with—Jang.191  
 
 187 See Jang v. Bos. Sci. Corp., 767 F.3d 1334, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting with approval the Federal 
Circuit’s opinion upholding jurisdiction in a prior appeal in the same litigation: “In previously ruling that this 
court had jurisdiction over Jang’s appeal, we noted that ‘[a]lthough this case arises from a contract claim, rather 
than directly as a patent infringement claim, Jang’s right to relief on the contract claim as asserted in the 
complaint depends on an issue of federal patent law—whether the stents sold by [the defendants] would have 
infringed [Jang’s patents].’ Nothing in the Supreme Court’s decision in Gunn alters that conclusion.” (quoting 
Jang v. Bos. Sci. Corp., 532 F.3d 1330, 1334 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citation omitted))). 
 188 Xitronix, 882 F.3d at 1078. Recall that the contract in Jang obligated the defendants to pay royalties 
only on products covered by “valid” patent. Jang, 767 F.3d at 1337. 
 189 See Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1285, 1290–92 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en 
banc). 
 190 Xitronix Corp. v. KLA-Tencor Corp., 916 F.3d 429, 439 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 2019 WL 
4921285 (U.S. Oct. 7, 2019); see also TransWeb, LLC v. 3M Innovative Props. Co., 812 F.3d 1295, 1307 (Fed. 
Cir. 2016) (“After Therasense, the showing required for proving inequitable conduct and the showing required 
for proving the fraud component of Walker Process liability may be nearly identical.”). 
 191 For this reason, the Federal Circuit was incorrect to analogize the Xitronix case to a recent D.C. Circuit 
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The defendant in Xitronix sought rehearing en banc in the Federal Circuit, 
but the court denied the petition by a vote of ten to two.192 Only Judges Newman 
and Lourie voted to rehear the case.193 And only Judge Newman filed an opinion 
explaining her rationale. That opinion pointed out many of the flaws in the 
panel’s decision that I identified above. She observed that the plaintiff’s Walker 
Process claim necessarily raised an issue about the enforceability of the 
underlying patent,194 and she noted that the panel’s decision was inconsistent 
with circuit precedent, including Jang.195 Ultimately, however, Judge 
Newman’s opinion embraced the flawed view that case-specific issues of 
validity or enforceability that merely require applying patent law are sufficient 
to trigger arising under jurisdiction.196  
Despite Judge Newman’s dissent, the Xitronix case next landed in the Fifth 
Circuit. Remarkably, the Fifth Circuit refused to decide the case and sent it back 
to the Federal Circuit.197 Though the Fifth Circuit correctly recognized several 
errors in the Federal Circuit panel’s opinion, the court made some errors of its 
own. And it certainly did not make the case that the Federal Circuit’s decision 
finding that it lacked jurisdiction was so “clearly erroneous” or “implausible” as 
to warrant sending the parties back to the Federal Circuit for yet another round 
of appellate litigation.198 
The Fifth Circuit began its analysis by examining the Federal Circuit’s pre-
Gunn case law, which it understood to hold that “the determination of fraud 
before the PTO necessarily involves a substantial question of patent law.”199 
 
decision exercising jurisdiction over a malpractice claim alleging that the defendants had engaged in negligence 
during patent prosecution, Seed Co. v. Westerman, 832 F.3d 325, 331 (D.C. Cir. 2016). In that decision, the 
basis for the D.C. Circuit exercising jurisdiction was that the case, “like Gunn, involve[d] no forward-looking 
questions about any patent’s validity” because the patent never actually issued. Id. Xitronix, by contrast, did 
involve questions that would affect the patent’s enforceability going forward.  
 192 Xitronix Corp. v. KLA-Tencor Corp., 892 F.3d 1194, 1195 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 193 Id. 
 194 Id. at 1199 (Newman, J., dissenting from denial of the petition for rehearing en banc) (“The panel states 
that Gunn requires moving the appeal to the Fifth Circuit because in the case at bar ‘[t]here is no dispute over 
the validity of claims.’ This is a puzzling statement, for that is the dispute: Xitronix states that a finding of fraud 
or inequitable conduct will ‘result in the … patent claims being rendered collaterally invalid and/or 
unenforceable.’” (citation omitted) (quoting Xitronix Corp. v. KLA-Tencor Corp., 882 F.3d 1075, 1078 (Fed. 
Cir. 2018))). 
 195 Id. at 1200. 
 196 See id. at 1196 (“If the issues of inequitable conduct or fraud in procuring [a] patent are no longer 
deemed to be a substantial issue of patent law, the court should speak en banc.”).  
 197 Xitronix Corp. v. KLA-Tencor Corp., 916 F.3d 429, 431 (5th Cir. 2019). 
 198 See Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 819 (1988) (holding that a transferee 
court should accept jurisdiction over a patent appeal so long as the transfer decision is “plausible” and not 
“clearly erroneous” (citation omitted)). 
 199 Xitronix, 916 F.3d at 439 (citing In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 
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After summarizing the Supreme Court’s decision in Gunn, the Fifth Circuit 
asserted that the Federal Circuit’s “reasoning [in its transfer decision] depended 
on several premises that we find implausible.”200 First, the Fifth Circuit noted, 
“[a] finding of fraud on the PTO would,” in fact, “render [the] patent effectively 
unenforceable in future cases,” strengthening the case that the federal question 
embedded in the plaintiff’s Walker Process claim is “substantial.”201 Consistent 
with my argument above, the Fifth Circuit’s statement is correct as a matter of 
preclusion doctrine. But, as I have also argued, the potential unenforceability of 
one particular patent is too case-specific to satisfy Gunn’s requirement that the 
embedded issue of patent law be significant to the federal system as a whole. 
Second, the Fifth Circuit criticized the Federal Circuit for distinguishing 
prior Federal Circuit decisions holding that Walker Process claims are governed 
by Federal Circuit precedent, not regional circuit precedent.202 In Xitronix, the 
Federal Circuit had reasoned that its precedent on choice of law did not mandate 
that it accept jurisdiction.203 Yet the Fifth Circuit wrote that the distinction 
between jurisdiction and choice of law “strikes us as immaterial. The tests for 
both questions turn on the Federal Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction over a given 
issue.”204 This statement reflects a misunderstanding of Federal Circuit choice-
of-law doctrine. As explained above, for better or worse, the scope of Federal 
Circuit law is not coextensive with the scope of Federal Circuit jurisdiction.205 
Thus, cases about whether Federal Circuit law applies to a given issue do not 
answer the question of whether a particular case falls within the Federal Circuit’s 
jurisdiction.  
Finally, the Fifth Circuit criticized the Federal Circuit’s reliance on 
precedent from outside the Federal Circuit in declining jurisdiction.206 Yet some 
aspects of the Fifth Circuit’s criticism are overblown. For instance, the Fifth 
Circuit chastised the Federal Circuit for citing a Third Circuit decision, In re 
Lipitor Antitrust Litigation, in which the Third Circuit exercised jurisdiction 
over a patent-related antitrust claim that asserted Walker Process fraud as one 
 
1330 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). This line of case law, it is worth noting, is consistent with the Federal Circuit’s 
general pre-Gunn view, discussed above, that the mere need to apply patent law was sufficient to create arising 
under jurisdiction over cases involving non-patent claims. See supra Part I.B. 
 200 Xitronix, 916 F.3d at 438–39. 
 201 Id. at 439 (citing C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). 
 202 Id. (citing Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1067 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). 
 203 Xitronix Corp. v. KLA-Tencor Corp., 882 F.3d 1075, 1078–79 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 204 Xitronix, 916 F.3d at 439. 
 205 See supra notes 179–81. 
 206 Xitronix, 916 F.3d at 439–40. 
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of many theories of antitrust liability.207 The Fifth Circuit noted that the Lipitor 
case involved “non-patent antitrust theories,” so it “clearly” belonged in the 
regional circuit.208 While that is an accurate description of the Lipitor case, the 
Third Circuit’s opinion in that case also reviewed the Federal Circuit’s pre-Gunn 
Walker Process case law as well as the Gunn decision itself and observed that, 
after Gunn, a claim of Walker Process fraud might no longer be a “substantial” 
question of federal law sufficient to trigger arising under jurisdiction.209 And the 
Federal Circuit in Xitronix relied on Lipitor for nothing more than the Third 
Circuit’s passing statement that the validity of the Federal Circuit’s pre-Gunn 
case law on jurisdiction over Walker Process claims “may be open to debate 
following Gunn.”210 
Also, the Fifth Circuit criticized the Federal Circuit for relying on a prior 
Fifth Circuit decision, USPPS, Ltd. v. Avery Dennison Corp.,211 which the 
Federal Circuit viewed as evidence that the Fifth Circuit had previously been 
willing to decide “a state law claim based on fraud on the PTO because the 
underlying fraud allegation ‘d[id] not cause the underlying hypothetical patent 
issues to be of substantial importance to the federal system as a whole.’”212 The 
Fifth Circuit was correct to note that USPPS did not, in fact, involve a claim of 
fraud on the Patent Office; it actually involved fraud claims against a business 
and its lawyers following a failed patent application.213 But the Fifth Circuit’s 
ultimate holding in USPPS is directly on point. In that case, the plaintiff “could 
not prove causation without proving the patentability of its invention.”214 Thus, 
USPPS—just like Xitronix—required an analysis of patentability. Yet the Fifth 
Circuit nevertheless exercised jurisdiction in USPPS because “[t]he hypothetical 
patent issues between the parties … [were] fact-specific and of no importance to 
the federal system”215—a result that is consistent with the Federal Circuit’s 
ruling in Xitronix declining jurisdiction.  
Ultimately, the Fifth Circuit concluded that, under Gunn, the federal 
question in Xitronix was indeed substantial. The court analogized the case to 
 
 207 855 F.3d 126, 146 (3d Cir. 2017). Other theories included the defendants’ filing of a sham citizen 
petition with the Food and Drug Administration and the defendants’ entry into a reverse payment settlement of 
patent litigation. Id. 
 208 Xitronix, 916 F.3d at 439–40. 
 209 See Lipitor, 855 F.3d at 146. 
 210 Xitronix Corp. v. KLA-Tencor Corp., 882 F.3d 1075, 1079 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 211 541 F. App’x 386 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 212 Xitronix, 882 F.3d at 1080 (quoting USPPS, 541 F. App’x at 390). 
 213 Xitronix, 916 F.3d at 440. 
 214 USPPS, 541 F. App’x at 389. 
 215 Id. at 390. 
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Grable and Smith, asserting that it turned on “the legality of a federal action.”216 
In Grable, the federal question was whether the government had lawfully seized 
land to satisfy a tax delinquency.217 In Smith, the question was whether Congress 
had acted constitutionally when it passed the Farm Loan Act.218 In Xitronix, the 
question, in the Fifth Circuit’s view, was whether the Patent Office had properly 
issued a patent.219 
But that, too, is an overstatement. The federal question in Xitronix is not 
about whether the government acted legally, it is about whether the patentee 
fraudulently goaded the Patent Office into issuing a patent. This focus on the 
legality of actions by a private party—not the federal government—
distinguishes Xitronix from Grable and Smith. Moreover, in both Grable and 
Smith, the determination of whether the government had acted lawfully would 
have clear implications for future cases. In Grable, a decision about whether the 
taxpayer received adequate notice would set precedent about the meaning of 
“notice” in the tax statute that would apply in any other dispute involving that 
statute.220 In Smith, the decision on whether the Farm Loan Act was 
constitutional would dictate the validity of bonds that were owned by numerous 
different persons and corporations and that were issued by dozens of banks that 
were owned at least in part by the federal government.221 In addition, the Smith 
case would (and did) set important precedent about Congress’s power under the 
Constitution’s Commerce Clause.222 In a case like Xitronix, by contrast, the 
enforceability of the patent in suit is relevant only to the parties to the case and, 
perhaps, to the small number of persons who might be accused of infringing that 
patent in the future. Either way, the effects of the determination of patent 
enforceability “would be limited to the parties and patents … before the … 
court”223—precisely the type of effects the Supreme Court in Gunn ruled were 
insufficient to establish arising under jurisdiction. 
It is possible, as the Fifth Circuit noted in Xitronix, that the court’s resolution 
 
 216 Xitronix, 916 F.3d at 441 (“This litigation has the potential to render [the] patent effectively 
unenforceable and to declare the PTO proceeding tainted by illegality.”). 
 217 Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 310 (2005). 
 218 Smith v. Kan. City Title & Tr. Co., 255 U.S. 180, 195 (1921). 
 219 Xitronix, 916 F.3d at 441. 
 220 See Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 311 (2005). 
 221 See Smith, 255 U.S. at 196; see also Larry Yackle, Federal Banks and Federal Jurisdiction in the 
Progressive Era: A Case Study of Smith v. K.C. Title & Trust Co., 62 U. KAN. L. REV. 255, 274 (2013) (noting 
that the mere filing of “the constitutional challenge in Smith wrecked the rural financial system established by 
the Act”). 
 222 Smith, 255 U.S. at 211. 
 223 Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 263 (2013). 
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of the Walker Process claim could “set precedent” about the scope of patent 
practitioners’ duty of candor to the Patent Office.224 But the mere possibility 
that, by applying the law to the facts of the case, a court might set precedent 
about a patent-related matter also does not seem sufficient to create arising under 
jurisdiction under Gunn. After all, in Gunn, if the court hearing the malpractice 
case determined that the patentee would have won his infringement suit because 
the experimental use exception did, in fact, apply, that ruling would stand as 
precedent about the contours of the experimental use doctrine. But, despite the 
precedent-creating potential of a federal decision, the Supreme Court in Gunn 
found federal jurisdiction lacking.225 Thus, the Fifth Circuit was wrong to assert 
that adjudication of a case-specific patent issue must be done exclusively in 
federal court (and in the Federal Circuit) simply because it might set precedent 
about a patent-related matter. Indeed, the leading treatise on federal jurisdiction 
notes that one consequence of Gunn is that “the standards of practice before a 
federal administrative agency (the Patent and Trademark Office) and the federal 
courts, for lawyers whose practice may be almost exclusively before those 
bodies, [are] regulated by state law, and enforced by state courts.”226 
In a final effort to defend its refusal to accept jurisdiction in Xitronix, the 
Fifth Circuit tried to downplay the jurisdictional significance of the case-specific 
nature of the federal question. Specifically, the Fifth Circuit noted that, although 
“any result would be ‘limited to the parties and patent involved in this matter,’” 
that is “likely true of many patent cases,” and so “[i]f this consideration alone 
sufficed to remove a case from the Federal Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction, there 
is no telling where the line should properly be drawn.”227 The Fifth Circuit is 
surely correct that the mine-run of federal patent cases do not set groundbreaking 
precedent and so their significance, like the Xitronix case itself, is limited to the 
parties at bar. But the Fifth Circuit was wrong to suggest that, if the Federal 
Circuit did not have jurisdiction over party-specific patent cases, jurisdictional 
chaos would result. That is because the party-specific issues at the center of most 
patent cases arise in the context of suits for patent infringement. Those cases 
involve claims created by the federal Patent Act, so they indisputably arise under 
patent law for jurisdictional purposes, regardless of whether the case has the 
 
 224 Xitronix, 916 F.3d at 441. 
 225 See Gunn, 568 U.S. at 264–65. 
 226 FALLON ET AL., supra note 159, at 836. While state law and state courts will, under Gunn, define the 
contours of malpractice law for patent lawyers, the Patent Office can still regulate matters of professionalism 
and ethics through its Office of Enrollment and Discipline. See generally Office of Enrollment and Discipline, 
U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., https://www.uspto.gov/about-us/organizational-offices/office-general-counsel/ 
office-enrollment-and-discipline-oed (last modified July 17, 2019, 5:46 PM). 
 227 Xitronix, 916 F.3d at 441 n.9. 
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potential to set important precedent or is merely a fact-specific dispute over 
infringement or validity. The case-specific nature of a dispute is sufficient to 
defeat jurisdiction only in the comparatively rare case, like Xitronix, that 
involves patent-related issues but does not include claims actually created by 
patent law. So, the Fifth Circuit’s argument, which seems to suggest that the 
Federal Circuit would have nothing to do if it did not have jurisdiction over 
party-specific disputes embedded within non-patent claims, fails. 
For now, the game of jurisdictional ping-pong in the Xitronix litigation 
seems to be at an end. One month after the Fifth Circuit refused to accept 
jurisdiction, the Federal Circuit issued a per curiam order stating that it would 
decide the case on the merits.228 But the court did not let the jurisdictional issue 
lie. Rather, in its order, the court noted several “flaws” in the Fifth Circuit’s 
analysis.229 First, the Federal Circuit criticized a statement by the Fifth Circuit 
that, for a case to arise under patent law, “all” claims in the plaintiff’s well-
pleaded complaint must raise substantial questions of patent law.230 Under 
Supreme Court precedent, the Federal Circuit (correctly) noted, only one claim 
needs to raise a substantial question of patent law so long as patent law is 
“essential” to each “theory” of the claim.231 Second, the Federal Circuit derided 
as “untenable” a suggestion by the Fifth Circuit that the scope of Federal Circuit 
jurisdiction under § 1295(a)(1) is broader than the district courts’ exclusive 
jurisdiction under § 1338(a).232 I explore this issue in more detail below,233 but, 
for present purposes, it suffices to say that the Federal Circuit made the 
reasonable point that both statutes use the same, “arising under” phrase for the 
same purpose: “to define the jurisdiction of particular federal courts.”234 Indeed, 
as discussed, the federal courts have, for better or worse, interpreted the identical 
language in both statutes in an identical fashion.235 Finally, the Federal Circuit 
chided the Fifth Circuit for relying on Federal Circuit precedent on choice of 
law to determine the scope of the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction.236 Matters of 
jurisdiction and choice of law in patent cases, the Federal Circuit noted, “are 
related but distinct.”237 
 
 228 Xitronix Corp. v. KLA-Tencor Corp., 757 F. App’x 1008, 1010 (Fed. Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 2019 
WL 4921285 (U.S. Oct. 7, 2019).  
 229 Xitronix, 757 F. App’x at 1010. 
 230 Id. at 1009. 
 231 Id. (citing Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 810–11 (1988)). 
 232 Id. 
 233 See infra Part III.B. 
 234 Xitronix, 757 F. App’x at 1009. 
 235 See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
 236 Xitronix, 757 F. App’x at 1009. 
 237 Id.; see supra notes 176–77 and accompanying text. 
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Despite these “flaws” in the Fifth Circuit’s opinion, the Federal Circuit 
accepted jurisdiction over the Xitronix case, noting that the Fifth Circuit’s 
conclusion that the Federal Circuit had jurisdiction was “not implausible.”238 
Yet, in accepting jurisdiction, the Federal Circuit (perhaps intentionally, perhaps 
not) highlighted a clear intracircuit split in Federal Circuit jurisdictional law. In 
explaining why it found the Fifth Circuit’s transfer decision “not implausible,” 
the Federal Circuit noted that the Supreme Court’s decision in Gunn “could be 
read to imply that whether the patent question at issue is substantial depends on 
whether the patent is ‘live’ such that the resolution of any question of patent law 
is not ‘merely hypothetical.’”239 In the case at hand, the Federal Circuit noted, 
“the underlying patent has not expired.”240 In addition, the Federal Circuit wrote, 
“the resolution of the [Walker Process] fraud question could affect [the patent’s] 
enforceability”241 (perhaps acknowledging the mistake from its prior opinion in 
which the court had said “[t]here is no dispute over the validity of the 
[patent]”).242 This view—that any dispute about the infringement or validity of 
a still-enforceable patent “arises under” patent law—is not only what the Fifth 
Circuit held in Xitronix, it is consistent with the Federal Circuit’s holding in Jang 
(as well as the Federal Circuit’s dicta in Forrester and Maxchief) that the 
jurisdictional analysis turns on whether the patent might be asserted in 
“subsequently arising infringement suits.”243 
However, in the very next paragraph of its order accepting jurisdiction over 
the Xitronix case, the Federal Circuit panel expressly disagreed with that view, 
stating: “[W]e reject the theory that our jurisdiction turns on whether a patent 
can still be asserted. Under this logic, cases involving Walker Process claims 
based on expired patents would go to the regional circuits while those with 
unexpired patents would come to us, despite raising the same legal questions.”244 
While the panel’s point might be logical (and, as I argued above, faithful to 
Supreme Court precedent), that is precisely the outcome contemplated by the 
Federal Circuit’s opinions in Jang, Forrester, and Maxchief, which cabin 
Gunn’s limits on jurisdiction to cases in which the underlying patent has been 
invalidated or expired or is no longer enforceable.245 
 
 238 Xitronix, 757 F. App’x at 1010. 
 239 Id. (quoting Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 261 (2013)). 
 240 Id.  
 241 Id.  
 242 Xitronix Corp. v. KLA-Tencor Corp., 882 F.3d 1075, 1078 (Fed. Cir. 2018); see also supra notes 188–
91 and accompanying text. 
 243 Jang v. Bos. Sci. Corp., 767 F.3d 1334, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 244 Xitronix, 757 F. App’x at 1010. 
 245 See supra Part II.A. In a decision issued as this Article was going to press, another panel of the Federal 
Circuit—also in conflict with cases such as Jang—wrote that “a run-of-the-mill question of infringement or 
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C. Getting Jurisdiction Right, Sometimes 
As the discussion thus far hopefully shows, there is serious confusion in the 
emerging appellate case law on arising under jurisdiction in patent cases. But I 
do not mean to suggest that courts since Gunn have never gotten the 
jurisdictional analysis right. The Federal Circuit has, for instance, correctly 
found that arising under jurisdiction existed in cases presenting purely legal 
questions about the constitutionality of both state statutes246 and federal statutes 
involving patents.247 Those constitutional challenges strongly resemble Smith in 
that they present nearly pure questions about Congress’s power under the 
Constitution’s Intellectual Property Clause248 or otherwise seek to have patent-
related statutes declared facially invalid on constitutional grounds.249 The court 
has also found arising under jurisdiction to be lacking over legal malpractice 
cases involving expired patents, consistent with Gunn.250 As I explain below, 
however, at least one of the Federal Circuit’s recent decisions involving a 
malpractice claim and supposedly expired patents massages the facts of the case 
to avoid inconsistency with the Federal Circuit’s decision in Jang.251 
 
validity” embedded within a state law claim does not create arising under jurisdiction, even if the patent remains 
in force. Inspired Dev. Grp., LLC v. Inspired Prods. Grp., LLC, 938 F.3d 1355, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2019). The 
portion of the opinion addressing Gunn’s requirement that the embedded federal question must be “substantial” 
was plainly dicta, for the court also found that the plaintiff’s state-created unjust enrichment claim did not 
necessarily raise a question of patent law. See id. at 1363. Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit in Inspired 
Development attempted to distinguish Jang on the ground that Jang involved a dispute over appellate jurisdiction 
as between the Federal Circuit and a regional circuit under § 1295 whereas Inspired Development involved a 
dispute over state court versus federal court jurisdiction under § 1338. See id at 1365. Yet current law does not 
support that distinction: both §§ 1295 and 1338 use the same “arising under” language, and courts usually treat 
precedent interpreting both sections interchangeably. Still, as a pure policy matter, it may make sense for the 
federal courts’ exclusive jurisdiction (vis-à-vis state courts) to be narrower than the Federal Circuit’s appellate 
jurisdiction (vis-à-vis the regional circuits). See infra Part III.B. 
 246 Vermont v. MPHJ Tech. Invs., LLC, 803 F.3d 635, 642–43 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (constitutional challenge 
to Vermont statute prohibiting “bad faith” acts of patent enforcement). 
 247 Madstad Eng’g, Inc. v. USPTO, 756 F.3d 1366, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (constitutional challenge to the 
provision of the America Invents Act (AIA) granting priority to the first inventor to file a patent application). 
 248 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“The Congress shall have the power … [t]o promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries.”). 
 249 See Madstad, 756 F.3d at 1370 (challenge to the AIA under the Intellectual Property Clause); MPHJ, 
803 F.3d at 642 (seeking a declaratory judgment that Vermont’s statute is “invalid or preempted … under the 
First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments, the Supremacy and Patent Clauses of the Constitution, and Title 35 of 
the U.S. Code [the Patent Act]”).  
 250 See NeuroRepair, Inc. v. Nath Law Grp., 781 F.3d 1340, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2015).  
 251 See infra Part III.C, which discusses Alps South, LLC v. Shumaker, Loop & Kendrick, LLP, No. 2018-
1717, 2018 WL 4522168, at *3 (Fed. Cir. June 14, 2018), a case in which the underlying patents had expired but 
the statute of limitations had not yet run meaning that, like in Jang (and, for that matter, Xitronix), future 
infringement suits could possibly be filed. 
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The regional circuits, too, have correctly applied Gunn in several patent-
related cases. For instance, the Third Circuit, in the Lipitor case discussed above, 
exercised jurisdiction over an appeal involving claims of Walker Process fraud 
because there were theories under which the plaintiffs could successfully prove 
their antitrust claims that had nothing to do with patent law.252 Also, the D.C. 
Circuit recently exercised jurisdiction over a case involving claims for legal 
malpractice that occurred during a failed patent prosecution, reasoning that the 
case “like Gunn, involve[d] no forward-looking questions about any patent’s 
validity, but instead solely concern[ed] whether unsuccessful patent applicants 
can recover against their attorneys.”253 And the Fifth Circuit itself has exercised 
jurisdiction over fraud claims involving failed patent applications, even though 
those claims required the plaintiffs to prove the patentability of their alleged 
inventions, because the patent issues were “hypothetical,” “fact-specific,” and 
“of no importance to the federal system.”254 
These decisions are helpful in formulating a clearer jurisdictional rule that is 
faithful to Supreme Court precedent—a task the Article turns to now. 
III. REDUCING CONFUSION ABOUT “ARISING UNDER” JURISDICTION IN 
PATENT CASES 
This final Part explores three broader implications of the more granular 
critique of the prevailing jurisdictional case law presented thus far. First, it 
synthesizes the doctrinal analysis above into a relatively clear jurisdictional rule 
that should help reduce uncertainty about and litigation over subject matter 
jurisdiction in many patent-related cases. Second, it considers a more radical 
jurisdictional reform: removing the connection between the federal courts’ 
exclusive jurisdiction over patent cases (to the exclusion of state courts) and the 
Federal Circuit’s appellate jurisdiction (vis-à-vis the regional circuits). Finally, 
it returns to the Federal Circuit jurisdictional case law discussed above and 
presents some initial evidence that those decisions are panel dependent—a 
phenomenon that highlights some potential shortcomings of the Federal Circuit 
as an institution.  
 
 252 In re Lipitor Antitrust Litig., 855 F.3d 126, 146 (3d Cir. 2017); see also Christianson v. Colt Indus. 
Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 810 (1988) (“[A] claim supported by alternative theories in the complaint may 
not form the basis for § 1338(a) jurisdiction unless patent law is essential to each of those theories.”). 
 253 Seed Co. v. Westerman, 832 F.3d 325, 331 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
 254 USPPS, Ltd. v. Avery Dennison Corp., 541 F. App’x 386, 389–90 (5th Cir. 2013). 
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A. A Clearer Rule 
1. Only Questions of Patent Law Trigger “Arising Under” Jurisdiction 
Over Non-Patent Claims 
Many scholars who have considered the question of when a claim created by 
state law should nevertheless be considered to arise under federal law have 
embraced malleable tests that give the federal courts discretion to exercise 
jurisdiction based on the weighing of multiple factors,255 including the strength 
of the federal interest in the case and the impact of a finding of jurisdiction on 
the federal docket.256 The test for arising jurisdiction articulated in Gunn (drawn 
from the Supreme Court’s earlier decision in Grable), is a little less ad hoc—it 
articulates four specific elements that must be satisfied for jurisdiction to 
exist.257 But it also embraces more malleable considerations such as the strength 
of the relevant federal interest and whether federal jurisdiction would upset the 
“congressionally approved” balance of cases between the state and federal 
courts.258 Indeed, despite Gunn’s four-element test, at least some courts of 
appeals have distilled three “factors” they believe “assist” in determining the 
most important element of that test: whether the embedded issue is “substantial” 
in the sense that it is important to the federal system as a whole. For example, 
the Eleventh Circuit, in the patent-related MDS case discussed above, articulated 
those factors as follows:  
First, a pure question of law is more likely to be a substantial federal 
question. Second, a question that will control many other cases is more 
likely to be a substantial federal question. Third, a question that the 
government has a strong interest in litigating in a federal forum is more 
 
 255 See, e.g., William Cohen, The Broken Compass: The Requirement That a Case Arise “Directly” Under 
Federal Law, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 890, 916 (1967) (“Establishing [whether a state-created claim arises under 
federal law] requires inquiries and guesses about such matters as these: the extent of the caseload increase for 
federal trial courts if jurisdiction is recognized; the extent to which cases of this class will, in practice, turn on 
issues of state or federal law; the extent of the necessity for an expert federal tribunal to handle issues of federal 
law that do arise; the extent of the necessity for a sympathetic federal tribunal in cases of this class.”). 
 256 See David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 568 (1985) (“[N]o 
formulation can possibly explain or even begin to account for the variety of outcomes [in cases involving 
embedded federal questions] unless it accords sufficient room for the federal courts to make a range of choices 
based on considerations of judicial administration and the degree of federal concern.”). But see Jonathan Remy 
Nash, On the Efficient Deployment of Rules and Standards to Define Federal Jurisdiction, 65 VAND. L. REV. 
509, 518 (2012) (highlighting the efficiency gains flowing from rule-based boundaries of federal subject matter 
jurisdiction). 
 257 Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 258 (2013) (“[F]ederal jurisdiction over a state law claim will lie if a 
federal issue is: (1) necessarily raised, (2) actually disputed, (3) substantial, and (4) capable of resolution in 
federal court without disrupting the federal-state balance approved by Congress.”). 
 258 Id. 
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likely to be a substantial federal question.259 
The Federal Circuit has also articulated these three factors on occasion.260 
As this Article has shown, a multifaceted, malleable, factor-driven 
jurisdictional test has not proved easy for the courts to apply,261 at least in patent 
cases. The work of applying that test and the uncertainty over the outcome may, 
therefore, not be worth it. As the Hart and Wechsler book notes, the Supreme 
Court has upheld federal question jurisdiction over state law claims in only four 
cases in the past one hundred years, and, “[e]ven in the lower courts, rather few 
decisions uphold jurisdiction.”262 The case in favor of an ill-defined standard is 
even further undercut by the severe consequences of a determination that 
jurisdiction is lacking—an objection that, to repeat, can be raised at any point in 
the litigation.263  
A simple rule that should be relatively easy to apply and that is consistent 
with Supreme Court precedent is that the mere need to apply federal law is never 
sufficient to create arising under jurisdiction.264 As the Court noted in Grable, 
since Smith, the Court has “sh[ied] away from the expansive view that mere need 
to apply federal law in a state-law claim will suffice to open the ‘arising under’ 
 
 259 MDS (Can.) Inc. v. Rad Source Techs., Inc., 720 F.3d 833, 842 (11th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted). 
 260 See Inspired Dev. Grp., LLC v. Inspired Prods. Grp., LLC, 938 F.3d 1355, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2019); 
NeuroRepair, Inc. v. Nath Law Grp., 781 F.3d 1340, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
 261 I am, to be sure, not the first person to make this observation. See, e.g., Daniel J. Meltzer, Jurisdiction 
and Discretion Revisited, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1891, 1913 (2004) (expressing, based on a review of the 
relevant case law, “doubt[]” about “whether federal judges, as intelligent and dedicated as most of them are, can 
in fact establish a coherent framework for the boundaries of subject matter jurisdiction predicated not upon a 
federal claim for relief but instead upon a federal ingredient in a state law claim for relief”); Mr. Smith Goes to 
Federal Court, supra note 77, at 2280 (finding that, from 1994 to 2002, the federal courts of appeals reversed 
the lower court judgment in forty-five of the sixty-nine reported cases in which they discussed arising under 
jurisdiction under over state-created claims); Nash, supra note 256, at 550–51 (arguing that the test for 
determining whether a case “arises under” federal law should be more rule-like and easier to satisfy—”there 
[should] be federal jurisdiction to hear a case even where the federal issue merely lurks in the background”—
but that the federal courts should retain discretion to abstain from hearing the case if the federal issues are not 
“central” to the dispute). 
 262 FALLON ET AL., supra note 159, at 836. 
 263 See Martha A. Field, Removal Reform: A Solution for Federal Question Jurisdiction, Forum Shopping, 
and Duplicative State-Federal Litigation, 88 IND. L.J. 611, 640 (2013) (noting that the cases in which federal 
question jurisdiction exists over state-created claims “are few and far between, making unnecessary[] 
discretionary jurisdictional rules that can disrupt a litigation in its final hours”).  
 264 Cf. Richard D. Freer, Of Rules and Standards: Reconciling Statutory Limitations on “Arising Under” 
Jurisdiction, 82 IND. L.J. 309, 340, 344 (2007) (suggesting “that federal question jurisdiction might be more 
compelling for questions of law rather than application of clearly established law to fact” but asserting that 
Grable “open[s] the lower federal court doors to claims requiring application or interpretation of federal law” 
(emphasis added)). 
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door.”265 “As early as 1912,” the Court continued, it “had confined federal-
question jurisdiction over state-law claims to those that ‘really and substantially 
involv[e] a dispute or controversy respecting the validity, construction or effect 
of [federal] law.’”266 Indeed, a year after deciding Grable, the Court in Empire 
refused to uphold federal question jurisdiction over a breach of contract claim 
involving an insurance policy issued under a contract with the federal 
government, emphasizing that Grable presented a nearly “pure issue of law”—
what does “notice” mean under the federal tax statute?—an issue “that could be 
settled once and for all and thereafter would govern numerous tax sale cases.”267 
The Court in Empire also emphasized that “[t]he state court in which the 
personal-injury suit was lodged is competent to apply federal law, to the extent 
it is relevant.”268 
In Smith, too, a pure question of federal constitutional law was at stake: Was 
the Farm Loan Act within Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause? As 
the Supreme Court noted in upholding jurisdiction: “[T]he controversy concerns 
the constitutional validity of an act of Congress which is directly drawn into 
question. The decision depends upon the determination of this issue.”269 
A rule holding that the mere need to apply federal law is not sufficient to 
create arising under jurisdiction is also consistent with the other two (less 
prominent) examples of Supreme Court cases upholding federal question 
jurisdiction over non-federal claims (in addition to Smith and Grable). Hopkins 
v. Walker, decided in 1917 (before Smith, actually), involved a state law claim 
to remove a cloud on title stemming from two apparently conflicting federal land 
grants.270 Based on that fact alone, the Court’s decision to uphold jurisdiction 
could be said to stand for proposition that a dispute over the validity of a federal 
grant of right—such as a utility patent—within a state law claim does indeed 
arise under federal law, consistent with the Federal Circuit’s decision in Jang 
and the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Xitronix. Interestingly, however, neither of 
those decisions cited Hopkins. And, in any event, it is clear that the claim in 
Hopkins turned on purely legal questions about the meaning and content of 
federal law. As the Supreme Court wrote: “[T]he determination of the plaintiffs’ 
 
 265 Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 313 (2005). 
 266 Id. (quoting Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U.S. 561, 569 (1912)) (alteration in original); see also Moore 
v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 291 U.S. 205, 213 (1934) (holding that a state law tort claim did not arise under 
federal law even though the claim was premised on the defendant’s violation of a federal statute). 
 267 Empire HealthChoice Assur., Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 700 (2006). 
 268 Id. at 701 (emphasis added). 
 269 Smith v. Kan. City Title & Tr. Co., 255 U.S. 180, 201 (1921). 
 270 Hopkins v. Walker, 244 U.S. 486, 488–89 (1917). 
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rights requires a construction of the [federal] mining laws under which the 
proceedings resulting in the patent were had ….”271  
The final Supreme Court decision upholding federal question jurisdiction 
over a state-created claim, City of Chicago v. International College of 
Surgeons,272 contains little analysis of the jurisdictional issue, but it, too, can be 
read to be consistent with a rule holding that the mere need to apply federal law 
does not trigger arising under jurisdiction. In that case, the plaintiffs filed claims 
under Illinois law seeking judicial review of a municipal agency’s land use 
decisions.273 As the Supreme Court explained, the plaintiffs’ complaints raised 
several federal constitutional claims, including that the relevant local 
ordinances, both facially and as applied, violated the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.274 In a very brief discussion, the Supreme Court upheld 
jurisdiction, noting simply that “[a]s we have explained, … ‘[e]ven though state 
law creates [a party’s] causes of action, its case might still ‘arise under’ the laws 
of the United States if a well-pleaded complaint established that its right to relief 
under state law requires resolution of a substantial question of federal law.’”275 
In the Court’s view, the plaintiffs’ “federal constitutional claims, which turn 
exclusively on federal law, unquestionably fit within this rule.”276 Though some 
aspects of the plaintiffs’ claims could be said to require merely applying federal 
law (for instance, their as-applied challenge to the relevant ordinances 
challenged “the manner in which the [agency] conducted its administrative 
proceedings”277), the facial challenge to the constitutional validity of the 
ordinances seems to have unquestionably presented a pure question of federal 
law. 
The notion that the need to apply federal law is not sufficient to create arising 
under jurisdiction and that, instead, a purely legal question is required draws 
some interesting support from Justice Holmes’s opinion in American Well 
Works, in which he made the statement—usually identified as underinclusive—
that “[a] suit arises under the law that creates the cause of action.”278 American 
Well Works was actually a patent case. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants 
had committed a tort by “falsely and maliciously” stating that a pump 
 
 271 Id. (emphasis added). 
 272 522 U.S. 156 (1997). 
 273 Id. at 160. 
 274 Id. at 164. 
 275 Id. (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr., 463 U.S. 1, 13 (1983)). 
 276 Id. 
 277 Id. at 160. 
 278 Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916). 
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manufactured by the plaintiff infringed the defendants’ patent and threatening 
and bringing infringement suits against the users of the plaintiff’s pump.279 
Though the veracity of the allegations of infringement and the validity of the 
defendants’ patent would surely be an issue in the case, Justice Holmes found 
those issues insufficient to create federal jurisdiction, noting, in the sentence 
immediately following the famous statement about a case arising under the law 
that creates the claim: “The fact that the justification [for the threats of suit] may 
involve the validity and infringement of a patent is no more material to the 
question under what law the suit is brought than it would be in an action of 
contract.”280 In other words, even setting aside the creation test, it seems that 
Justice Holmes thought the American Well Works case would not arise under 
federal law because it involved case-specific issues of infringement and 
validity.281 
2. Objections and Responses 
Throughout the discussion above, I have attempted to anticipate and respond 
to potential criticisms of the reimagined jurisdictional rule I have proposed, 
which focuses on the existence of a question of federal patent law embedded 
within a non-patent claim. This subpart highlights the most important objections 
to my argument and provides a few additional responses.  
First, one might contend that Federal Circuit cases such as Jang already 
provide a relatively clear rule: Any issue about the infringement or validity of 
an in-force patent creates arising under jurisdiction. Indeed, aspects of the 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Gunn can be understood to support the view that 
case-specific issues of infringement or validity of a patent that remains in force 
 
 279 Id. at 258–59. 
 280 Id. at 260. 
 281 Though American Well Works is usually understood to concern the “substantiality” element of federal 
question jurisdiction, the opinion might be better understood as finding no jurisdiction because the federal 
issue—whether or not substantial—was not part of the plaintiff’s well-pleaded tort claim. Specifically, Justice 
Holmes’s opinion seemed to indicate that the plaintiff could have prevailed separate and apart from the validity 
or infringement of the patent. He wrote: “If the State adopted for civil proceedings the saying of the old criminal 
law: the greater the truth the greater the libel, the validity of the patent would not come in question at all. In 
Massachusetts the truth would not be a defence if the statement was made from disinterested malevolence.” Id.; 
see also Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 810 (1988) (“If ‘on the face of a well-pleaded 
complaint there are … reasons completely unrelated to the provisions and purposes of [the patent laws] why the 
[plaintiff] may or may not be entitled to the relief it seeks,’ then the claim does not ‘arise under’ those laws.” 
(alterations in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr., 463 U.S. 
1, 26 (1983))). It is worth noting that American Well Works was decided before Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 
U.S. 64 (1938), so, even though the American Well Works case itself began in federal district court in Arkansas, 
the federal court was applying the “general law” of torts. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3526232
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3361240 
GUGLIUZZAPROOFS_12.5.19 12/9/2019 12:01 PM 
2019] JURISDICTION IN PATENT CASES 505 
can trigger arising under jurisdiction because resolution of those issues could 
have “forward-looking” effects in future litigation involving the same patent. 
For instance, in explaining why the patent question embedded in the plaintiff’s 
malpractice claim was not substantial, Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion noted 
that, regardless of the outcome of the malpractice suit, “Minton’s patent will 
remain invalid.”282 One could infer from this passage that a case in which the 
patent has not yet expired or been ruled invalid would arise under federal patent 
law.  
Yet there are also, as noted, many aspects of the Gunn opinion emphasizing 
that questions that are important only to the parties to the case and the patent in 
suit are not the type of “substantial” federal questions that cause a case to arise 
under federal patent law.283 And all of the Supreme Court’s prior decisions 
upholding federal question jurisdiction based on embedded federal issues 
involved pure issues of law that would affect future cases involving litigants who 
were not parties to the case at hand. So the distinction drawn by the Federal 
Circuit between party-specific, backward-looking issues (no jurisdiction) and 
party-specific, forward-looking issues (jurisdiction), is on shaky doctrinal 
footing.  
Moreover, for the reasons explained above,284 an embedded finding on 
infringement or validity of an in-force patent will often have little or no forward-
looking effects. On the issue of infringement, defendants who might be sued by 
the patentee in the future will frequently be employing products or processes 
that differ from the accused products or processes in the first suit. And, on 
validity, due process significantly limits forward-looking impact, as a patentee 
may not offensively rely on a finding that its patent is not invalid against 
different accused infringers in the future. Thus, case-specific, party-specific, and 
patent-specific issues of validity or infringement, even though they require a 
court to apply federal patent law, do not seem like the type of questions that are 
sufficiently important to the federal system as a whole to justify jurisdiction 
under Gunn. A purely legal question about the content of federal patent law, by 
contrast, would trigger exclusive jurisdiction because the resolution of that 
 
 282 Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 261 (2013). 
 283 See, e.g., id. at 263 (“[E]ven assuming that a state court’s case-within-a-case adjudication may be 
preclusive under some circumstances, the result would be limited to the parties and patents that had been before 
the state court. Such ‘fact-bound and situation-specific’ effects are not sufficient to establish federal arising 
under jurisdiction.” (quoting Empire HealthChoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 701 (2006))); id. 
at 263–64 (“There is no doubt that resolution of a patent issue in the context of a state legal malpractice action 
can be vitally important to the particular parties in that case. But something more, demonstrating that the question 
is significant to the federal system as a whole, is needed.”). 
 284 See supra Part II.A. 
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question would affect numerous future cases involving litigants who were not 
parties to the original suit, similar to a case like Grable. 
Another possible objection to a jurisdictional rule that turns on the existence 
of a pure question of patent law being embedded within a non-patent claim is 
that the line between questions of law and questions of fact in patent cases is 
hazy; many issues in patent litigation that are highly case specific, such as claim 
construction and validity, are actually considered to present questions of law.285 
However, many of those questions of law are resolved based on factual 
considerations,286 so they are not the pure questions of law that would trigger 
jurisdiction under the rule I propose. Moreover, the notion that certain case-
specific and patent-specific issues of patent scope or validity present entirely 
legal questions is, as I have explained in prior writing, normatively dubious.287 
This is not the space for a comprehensive analysis of the law/fact divide in patent 
litigation—I will save that analysis for future work.288 For present purposes, it 
suffices to say that, when I argue that a question of patent law is required to 
trigger jurisdiction, I mean the sort of abstract question that can be resolved 
without reference to the particulars of the case,289 such as a question of statutory 
interpretation or of the constitutional validity of some provision of the patent 
statute.290 Contrary to Federal Circuit decisions such as Jang, issues about the 
scope or validity of one particular patent are not sufficient.  
 
 285 See generally ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY 913–
15 (7th ed. 2017) (summarizing the law/fact distinction on numerous issues that arise in patent litigation).  
 286 See generally Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 838 (2015) (“While we held in 
Markman that the ultimate issue of the proper construction of a claim should be treated as a question of law, we 
also recognized that in patent construction, subsidiary factfinding is sometimes necessary. Indeed, we referred 
to claim construction as a practice with ‘evidentiary underpinnings,’ a practice that ‘falls somewhere between a 
pristine legal standard and a simple historical fact.’” (quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 
370, 378, 388, 390 (1996))); Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 96–97 (2011) (“While the ultimate 
question of patent validity is one of law, the same factual questions underlying the PTO’s original examination 
of a patent application will also bear on an invalidity defense in an infringement action.” (citation omitted) 
(quoting Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966))).  
 287 See Gugliuzza, supra note 55, at 608, 627 (arguing that both patent eligibility and claim construction, 
two issues often treated by courts as presenting purely legal questions, instead have significant factual aspects). 
 288 See Paul R. Gugliuzza, Law, Fact, and Patent Validity (Nov. 13, 2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on 
file with author). 
 289 See Gary Lawson, Proving the Law, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 859, 882 n.68 (1992). 
 290 E.g., Madstad Eng’g, Inc. v. USPTO, 756 F.3d 1366, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2014). It is worth noting that 
federal district judges frequently must draw lines between pure questions of law, mixed questions of law and 
fact, and pure questions of fact when, for instance, determining whether an interlocutory appeal is permissible. 
See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (permittting judges to certify an order for immediate appeal if, among other things, it 
presents a “controlling question of law”); see also Century Pac., Inc. v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 574 F. Supp. 2d 
369, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“The question of law certified for interlocutory appeal must refer to a pure question 
of law that the reviewing court could decide quickly and cleanly without having to study the record.”) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
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Attacking my argument from the other direction, it is worth noting that one 
passage of the Gunn opinion seems to suggest that even a novel, pure question 
of federal patent law would not be sufficient to trigger arising under jurisdiction 
absent other considerations indicating a strong federal interest in the case. In that 
passage, the Chief Justice first rejected the argument that the need for legal 
uniformity counseled in favor of federal jurisdiction over the malpractice suit, 
emphasizing that “state courts can be expected to hew closely to the pertinent 
federal precedents” when deciding what would have happened in the underlying 
infringement suit but for the attorney’s alleged negligence.291 “As for more novel 
questions of patent law that may arise for the first time in a state court ‘case 
within a case,’” the Chief Justice continued, “they will at some point be decided 
by a federal court in the context of an actual patent case, with review in the 
Federal Circuit.”292 This statement could be read to mean that the nature of the 
question (legal versus factual) is not dispositive in the jurisdictional analysis.  
But Chief Justice Roberts’s statement cannot be taken literally. If it were true 
that questions of federal law cannot trigger arising under jurisdiction when those 
questions might eventually be decided by a federal court, then both Smith and 
Grable were wrongly decided. The issue about the meaning of “notice” in the 
federal tax statute could have arisen in a future case brought directly against the 
IRS challenging the legality of a seizure.293 Similarly, in a case like Smith, which 
implicated federally chartered banks, federal treasury bonds, and numerous 
banks in which the U.S. Treasury had invested public funds,294 the 
constitutionality of the Farm Loan Act could have been raised in a variety of 
suits falling within federal question jurisdiction, to say nothing of the possibility 
of diversity jurisdiction or of the extremely high likelihood of Supreme Court 
review if a state court found an act of Congress unconstitutional.295 Thus, the 
Chief Justice’s statement is probably best read as making a point unique to patent 
cases: If a state law claim raises a novel question about the legal requirements 
for patent validity or infringement, that question is likely to arise in a future 
infringement suit—and the federal courts will have exclusive jurisdiction over 
that suit. By contrast, in cases like Grable and Smith, the relevant question of 
 
 291 Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 262 (2013). 
 292 Id.  
 293 For an example of a case brought directly against the IRS challenging the adequacy of notice under the 
same statute at issue in Grable, see Kabakjian v. United States, 92 F. Supp. 2d 435, 439–40 (E.D. Pa. 2000), 
aff’d, 267 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 294 See Smith v. Kan. City Title & Tr. Co., 255 U.S. 180, 196–97 (1921). 
 295 See STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 264 (10th ed. 2013) (“Where the decision 
below holds a federal statute unconstitutional … certiorari is usually granted because of the obvious importance 
of the case.”). 
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federal law might be raised in the future, and the federal courts might have 
jurisdiction (though certainly not exclusive jurisdiction). Because the possibility 
of future resolution of that federal question by a federal court in a case like 
Grable or Smith is more speculative, there is a stronger reason for a federal court 
to exercise jurisdiction over a state-created claim raising that issue.  
Another critique of a jurisdictional rule that turns on the existence of a 
question of patent law involves matters of timing. How can a trial court deciding 
jurisdiction at the outset of a case know whether the case involves a jurisdiction-
triggering legal question? This critique, however, can largely be answered 
through the principle that the burden of proof lies on the party attempting to 
invoke federal jurisdiction.296 So a plaintiff who wants to file, say, a patent 
malpractice claim in federal court would have the burden of identifying a 
specific legal question that triggers jurisdiction and of convincing the court that 
that legal question is essential to each of its theories of recovery. Things could 
be trickier in a removal scenario, where the defendant would have to identify a 
question of patent law in the plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint, but it would not 
be unreasonable to ask the defendant to at least try to do so. (Think of it as the 
defendant carrying an initial burden of production.) The burden would then shift 
to the plaintiff to explain why there is, in fact, no question of patent law 
embedded in its claim, with the ultimate burden of persuading the court that 
jurisdiction exists remaining on the defendant. 
One final objection to a jurisdictional rule that turns on the existence of a 
question of law is grounded in an alternative interpretation of the leading 
Supreme Court cases on embedded federal questions. The cases in which the 
Court has upheld jurisdiction over state-created claims all arguably presented 
disputes over the legality of an action taken by the federal government. Smith 
(constitutionality of an act of Congress) and Grable (legality of an IRS tax 
seizure), most notably, fit this mold. One might say that a case in which an in-
force federal patent might be held invalid similarly presents a question about the 
legality of an action taken by the federal government (issuing a patent) and so 
similarly justifies arising under jurisdiction. 
A rule that jurisdiction exists when the validity of an in-force patent is in 
dispute is, I readily admit, the most appealing alternative to the rule I have 
proposed. It has support in Supreme Court precedent, and it is relatively clear. 
Indeed, it could actually function as a complement to the rule I have proposed. 
Arising under jurisdiction could exist if the case presents either (a) a pure 
 
 296 See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). 
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question of patent law or (b) a question about the validity of a patent that can 
still be enforced. In the end, however, the legality of a patent examiner issuing 
one particular patent seems so inconsequential to the federal system as a 
whole—arguably the key consideration of both Grable and Gunn297—that it 
probably should not trigger “arising under” jurisdiction—particularly in a patent 
case, where, if a court finds that there is a substantial question of patent law 
embedded within a state law claim, state courts are entirely excluded from 
shaping their own state’s law in that area.298  
Moreover, both Grable and Smith can be distinguished from a case in which 
the embedded federal issue is a case-specific, fact-specific question about patent 
validity. Grable was, of course, a dispute about the legality of the IRS’s tax 
seizure activities, but the case would also set legal precedent about the type of 
notice the tax statue requires. Smith, too, was a dispute over the legality of an 
act of Congress, but that dispute turned on an entirely legal inquiry into 
Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause. Finally, though the notion that 
jurisdiction exists any time there is a dispute over the validity of an in-force 
patent appears to be a relatively clear rule, determining whether a patent is “in 
force” is not always as easy as it would seem. The statute of limitations for a 
claim of patent infringement extends for six years beyond the patent’s 
expiration,299 meaning that even rulings about the validity of an expired patent 
can have forward-looking effects. And breach of licensing cases often involve 
numerous patents, some of which may have been invalidated or expired and 
others that have not.300 Indeed, federal judges deciding patent-related 
jurisdictional disputes are often confused about whether the relevant patents are 
or are not in force.301  
 
 297 See, e.g., Gunn, 568 U.S. at 260 (“As our past cases show, … it is not enough that the federal issue be 
significant to the particular parties in the immediate suit; that will always be true when the state claim 
‘necessarily raise[s]’ a disputed federal issue, as Grable separately requires. The substantiality inquiry under 
Grable looks instead to the importance of the issue to the federal system as a whole.” (second alteration in 
original)). 
 298 Cf. Dell Techs. Inc. v. TiVo Corp., No. 1:18-CV-666-LY, 2019 WL 2410085, at *10 (W.D. Tex. June 
6, 2019) (declining jurisdiction over a breach of contract case with an embedded question of patent infringement, 
noting that “allowing this case to proceed forward in federal court would … diminish the role of the state of 
Texas in regulating commercial agreements and misrepresentations”). 
 299 35 U.S.C. § 286 (2012). 
 300 Cf. MDS (Can.) Inc. v. Rad Source Techs., Inc., 720 F.3d 833, 840, 843 (11th Cir. 2013) (finding no 
“arising under” jurisdiction over a breach of license dispute where one of the relevant patents had expired but 
others had not). 
 301 See, e.g., Xitronix Corp. v. KLA-Tencor Corp., 892 F.3d 1194, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (Newman, J., 
dissenting from the denial of the petition for rehearing en banc) (characterizing MDS as having ruled that “the 
question of infringement was not substantial because the patent had expired” when, in fact, only one of the 
relevant patents had expired); Xitronix Corp. v. KLA-Tencor Corp., 916 F.3d 429, 440 (5th Cir. 2019) (repeating 
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To be sure, if the issue ever came before the Supreme Court, the Court might 
well rule that the validity of an in-force patent is a substantial question of patent 
law that warrants exclusive federal and Federal Circuit jurisdiction because of 
the preclusive effects that stem from a finding of invalidity. In my view, 
however, issues about the validity of one particular patent, though they might 
raise questions about the legality of an action by the federal government (issuing 
a patent), are not sufficiently important to federal system as a whole to create 
jurisdiction under Gunn. 
B. Delinking District Court and Federal Circuit Jurisdiction 
The discussion in the Article thus far has largely blended analysis of district 
court jurisdiction with Federal Circuit jurisdiction because the two statutes use 
the same “arising under” language and, under current law, are interpreted to have 
the same scope. As a normative matter, however, current law arguably makes 
little sense. Suppose, for example, a civil action raising case-specific patent 
issues is properly in federal district court beyond dispute, perhaps because, 
whether or not the embedded patent issues are substantial, the parties have 
diverse citizenship (and the amount-in-controversy requirement is satisfied)302 
or there are federally created claims in the case that clearly create jurisdiction 
under the general federal question statute.303 Under Federal Circuit decisions 
such as Jang, most of those cases will be routed to the Federal Circuit on appeal. 
Under the more stringent interpretation of Gunn that I have proposed, as well as 
the Federal Circuit panel’s original decision in Xitronix, cases involving party- 
or patent-specific issues of infringement or validity will be heard by the regional 
circuits. One potential policy defense of this latter regime is that it would be 
good for courts besides the Federal Circuit to decide patent cases sometimes. 
Many commentators have identified the lack of “percolation” by peer-level 
courts as a significant problem in modern patent law,304 and so they have 
proposed having additional courts of appeals decide patent cases.305 But the 
 
the argument that the patent in MDS had expired), cert. denied, 2019 WL 4921285 (U.S. Oct. 7, 2019); Alps 
South, LLC v. Shumaker, Loop & Kendrick, LLP, No. 2018-1717, 2018 WL 4522168, at *3 (Fed. Cir. June 14, 
2018) (discussing a district court decision erroneously concluding that the statute of limitations for infringement 
had expired). 
 302 See, e.g., Jang v. Bos. Sci. Corp., 767 F.3d 1334, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 303 See, e.g., Xitronix, 916 F.3d at 442. 
 304 See Diane P. Wood, Is It Time to Abolish the Federal Circuit’s Exclusive Jurisdiction in Patent Cases?, 
13 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 1, 4 (2013). But cf. John M. Golden, The Supreme Court As “Prime Percolator”: 
A Prescription for Appellate Review of Questions in Patent Law, 56 UCLA L. REV. 657, 662 (2009) (suggesting 
that the Supreme Court can perform the function of percolating patent law—a task performed by the various 
regional circuits in most other areas of federal law). 
 305 See, e.g., Nard & Duffy, supra note 48, at 1661. 
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cases that truly involve the contours of federal patent law will—under practically 
any understanding of Gunn—still be routed to the Federal Circuit. So, 
percolation is not an adequate justification for a regime in which the only issues 
of patent law decided by the regional circuits are case-specific issues of validity 
and infringement. Is a better jurisdictional design possible? 
Though the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in Xitronix has numerous flaws, many of 
which I detailed above, the opinion concluded with an interesting law-reform 
argument. Specifically, the court questioned whether Gunn, which involved a 
dispute over state-versus-exclusive-federal jurisdiction under § 1338(a), should 
apply to cases like Xitronix, which involved a dispute over regional-circuit-
versus-Federal-Circuit jurisdiction under §1295(a)(1).306 As the Fifth Circuit 
noted, Gunn’s formulation of the “substantiality” requirement—which focuses 
on the importance of the case to the federal system as a whole—makes little 
sense as a criterium for sorting cases among the federal courts of appeals.307 And 
the fourth element of the test for federal jurisdiction under Grable and Gunn—
that the exercise of federal jurisdiction must not upset the congressionally 
approved balance of authority between the state and federal judiciaries—“is 
even less suited to the task of sorting cases between the circuits,” as the Fifth 
Circuit also noted.308  
Indeed, there are good reasons for the test for Federal Circuit jurisdiction—
once a case is properly in federal court—to be broader than the test for exclusive 
federal jurisdiction in the district courts. In choosing between state and exclusive 
federal jurisdiction, there are, as noted, weighty federalism considerations at 
play.309 Exclusive federal jurisdiction deprives state courts of the ability to shape 
their own state’s law simply because a case involves a federal patent. Though a 
multi-element, multi-factor test for jurisdiction (such as the test in Gunn as 
interpreted by the lower courts) incentivizes costly litigation over forum 
selection, that litigation may be worth it given those stakes.  
But once a patent-related case is properly in federal court, it is not clear what 
interest is served by applying the stringent Gunn test to sort cases among the 
circuits. If the case is in federal court under the general federal question statute 
(a patent-related antitrust claim, for instance), there are no federalism values to 
protect whatsoever. If the case is in federal court because of diversity (a patent-
related breach of contract case, perhaps), it might be suggested that the judges 
 
 306 Xitronix, 916 F.3d at 442. 
 307 Id. 
 308 Id. 
 309 See Gugliuzza, supra note 47, at 69–70. 
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of the regional circuits are more familiar with the relevant state law that governs 
the non-patent aspects of the claim under Erie. But that concern about the 
relative expertise of regional circuit versus Federal Circuit judges on matters of 
state law is a far cry from the trial-level concern about entirely disabling state 
courts from deciding claims created by their own state’s law. Moreover, any 
expertise gained by having regional circuit judges decide state law issues could 
be outweighed by those judges’ inexperience in handling the issues of patent 
infringement or validity embedded within the state law claim. In short, there is 
a solid (if not locktight) normative argument that the Federal Circuit should have 
jurisdiction over federal question and even diversity cases that require mere 
application of patent law. 
Though such a regime could be appealing as a policy matter, both 
§ 1295(a)(1) (the Federal Circuit’s jurisdictional statute) and § 1338(a) (which 
confers exclusive jurisdiction on the federal district courts) use the exact same 
“arising under” language. And the Supreme Court has repeatedly insisted on 
“linguistic consistency” when interpreting that phrase, at least as it appears in 
§ 1338 and the general federal question statute, § 1331.310 The Court has also 
equated the federal courts’ exclusive jurisdiction under § 1338 with the Federal 
Circuit’s jurisdiction under § 1295,311 though that case, it is worth noting, 
involved an older version of § 1295, which explicitly referenced § 1338, making 
the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction turn on whether the district court’s jurisdiction 
was based, “in whole or in part, on section 1338.”312  
As the Fifth Circuit observed in Xitronix, the America Invents Act (AIA), 
passed in 2011, amended the Federal Circuit’s jurisdictional statute to delete the 
reference to § 1338.313 Section 1295(a)(1) now confers on the Federal Circuit 
jurisdiction over cases involving claims or counterclaims “arising under … any 
Act of Congress relating to patents.”314 The Fifth Circuit relied heavily on that 
statutory change to argue that Gunn’s test for allocating patent-related cases 
between the federal courts and state courts should not apply when allocating 
appeals among the circuits.315 
The change of language in the AIA, however, would be a subtle way of 
 
 310 Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 257 (2013); Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 
535 U.S. 826, 829–30 (2002); Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 808–09 (1988). 
 311 Christianson, 486 U.S. at 814. 
 312 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2006). 
 313 America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 19(b), 125 Stat. 284, 331–32 (2011).  
 314 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2012). 
 315 See Xitronix Corp. v. KLA-Tencor Corp., 916 F.3d 429, 442–43 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 2019 
WL 4921285 (U.S. Oct. 7, 2019). 
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overruling a large body of case law that has applied the same jurisdictional test 
under both § 1295 and § 1338.316 As the Supreme Court noted in a recent 
decision on another procedural issue in patent law (venue), when Congress 
wants to overturn a settled practice of the federal courts, Congress must make 
its intent clear in the text of the statute.317 Yet the statutory text, as noted, uses 
the exact same phrase to delineate both the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal 
courts and the appellate jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit. Moreover, I can find 
nothing in the legislative history of the amendment to § 1295 to indicate that 
Congress sought to delink the Federal Circuit’s appellate jurisdiction from the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the district courts.318  
Still, the idea of disconnecting district court and Federal Circuit jurisdiction 
is an interesting one, and the Fifth Circuit offered some persuasive reasons for 
doing so: 
It would be quite reasonable to have a system that imposes different 
restrictions at the entrance to the federal system and at the fork in the 
road leading to different circuits. The exclusionary Gunn-Grable test, 
screening out most potential cases at the entrance, protects federal dis-
trict courts from overload and reflects constitutional respect for state 
courts and state prerogatives. As to those cases that do make it into the 
federal system, preservation of uniformity comes to the fore, furthered 
by Christianson’s inclusionary test for routing appeals to the Federal 
Circuit. [That is, the standard under which the Federal Circuit must 
accept a transfer so long as the transferee court’s jurisdictional analysis 
is “plausible” and not “clearly erroneous.”] Such a test also promotes 
judicial economy by simplifying the jurisdictional inquiry and avoid-
ing the jurisdictional ping-pong that Christianson aimed to end.319 
In short, there are good reasons, grounded in federalism, for federal courts 
to be cautious about finding that a state law claim must be decided exclusively 
 
 316 In addition to the Supreme Court’s decision in Christianson, the Federal Circuit has equated these two 
statutes in numerous decisions, including several issued after Gunn. See, e.g., Xitronix Corp. v. KLA-Tencor 
Corp., 882 F.3d 1075, 1079 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Vermont v. MPHJ Tech. Invs., LLC, 803 F.3d 635, 645–46 (Fed. 
Cir. 2015); Jang v. Bos. Sci. Corp., 767 F.3d 1334, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Krauser v. BioHorizons, Inc., 753 
F.3d 1263, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 317 TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514, 1520 (2017) (“When Congress 
intends to effect a change of that kind, it ordinarily provides a relatively clear indication of its intent in the text 
of the amended provision.”). 
 318 See H.R. REP. NO. 112-98 (2011); see also H.R. REP. NO. 109-407 (2006) (report on an earlier version 
of the amendment that was eventually incorporated into the AIA); Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History 
of the America Invents Act: Part II of II, 21 FED. CIR. B.J. 539, 539–40 (2011) (describing the purpose of the 
amendment to § 1295(a)(1) as being to “extend the Federal Circuit’s appellate jurisdiction to compulsory patent 
… counterclaims, abrogating Holmes Group”). 
 319 Xitronix, 916 F.3d at 443. 
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by the federal courts under § 1338(a)320—hence my proposed rule limiting 
exclusive federal jurisdiction under § 1338(a) to cases raising pure questions of 
federal patent law. But once a case is already in federal court—either because 
the claim is created by federal law and indisputability falls within the federal 
courts’ general federal question jurisdiction under § 1331 (as was the case in 
Xitronix) or because there is diversity jurisdiction (as was the case in Jang)—
the Federal Circuit’s expertise on patent matters and the general desire for 
uniformity in patent law and the adjudication of patent cases could plausibly be 
said to warrant Federal Circuit jurisdiction. In other words, while the mere need 
to apply federal patent law ought not be sufficient to trigger exclusive federal 
jurisdiction under § 1338(a), those same issues perhaps should warrant Federal 
Circuit appellate jurisdiction under § 1295(a)(1).321 
C. The Panel Dependency of Federal Circuit Jurisdictional Rulings 
Turning back to the Federal Circuit’s recent jurisdictional decisions to 
conclude the Article. Though the set of post-Gunn rulings in the Federal Circuit 
is, quantitatively speaking, relatively small, there is some intriguing evidence of 
panel dependency that is worth pointing out. On my reading of the case law, it 
seems clear that at least three judges—all of whom have participated in multiple 
hotly disputed cases—have strong views on the proper scope of the federal 
courts’ and the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction over cases arising under patent law. 
First, Judge Dyk appears to clearly favor a broad scope of arising under 
 
 320 Cf. Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 831–32 (2002) (Scalia, J.) 
(holding that allowing a patent law counterclaim to trigger the federal courts’ exclusive jurisdiction over patent 
cases would fail to respect “the rightful independence of state governments”). 
 321 In an opinion issued as this Article was going to press, the Federal Circuit suggested that cases such as 
Jang, which hold that a case arises under patent law any time the court must decide an issue of validity or 
infringement of an in-force patent, are relevant only to determining the scope of Federal Circuit appellate 
jurisdiction (vis-à-vis the regional circuits) under § 1295; cases involving fact-specific issues of validity or 
infringement, the court wrote, do not trigger exclusive federal jurisdiction (vis-à-vis state courts) under § 1338. 
Inspired Dev. Grp., LLC v. Inspired Prods. Grp., LLC, 938 F.3d 1355, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“Jang’s reasoning 
is worlds away from the supposed state-federal conflict here. The analysis in Jang took place entirely between 
federal courts.”). That suggestion was contained in a portion of the opinion that was clearly dicta, see supra note 
245, and it is difficult to justify under earlier Federal Circuit opinions viewing the scope of §§ 1295 and 1338 to 
be identical, see supra notes 43, 62. The Federal Circuit in Inspired Development attempted to explain away 
Jang by noting that the dispute in Jang—which involved Federal Circuit versus regional circuit jurisdiction—
raised a question that was important “to the federal system as a whole” under Gunn because different federal 
courts might reach different conclusions about the validity of a single patent. Inspired Dev., 938 F.3d at 1365. 
As explained above, however, principles of issue preclusion would ensure against any such differing conclusions 
(at least to the maximum extent permitted by due process), regardless of which court decided the first case. See 
supra notes 140-147 and accompanying text. Still, though Inspired Developments is questionable as a matter of 
existing doctrine, the opinion is consistent with this Article’s normative argument for different jurisdictional 
rules at the trial level and on appeal. 
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jurisdiction. He was the author of the opinions in both Forrester and Maxchief, 
two opinions that each espoused—in passages that were unnecessary to the 
court’s decision—the view that case-specific issues of validity or infringement 
of a patent that can still be enforced justify jurisdiction.322 And Judge Dyk was 
on the panel in Jang, the case that imported that dicta from Forrester into a 
holding of the court.323 Though Judge Linn wrote the Jang opinion, that opinion 
relied heavily on an earlier, pre-Gunn opinion in that same litigation that had 
upheld jurisdiction because the plaintiff’s “right to relief on [his] contract claim 
… depends on an issue of federal patent law—whether the stents sold by [the 
defendants] would have infringed [the plaintiff’s] patents.”324 That earlier 
opinion, it may not be surprising to learn, was written by Judge Dyk (and joined 
by Judge Linn). 
Second, Judge Newman seems to similarly adhere to a broad conception of 
arising under jurisdiction. She was on the panel in Forrester—the case in which 
Judge Dyk wrote that the Federal Circuit’s case law extending arising under 
jurisdiction to tort claims based on allegedly false assertions of patent 
infringement “may well have survived … Gunn.”325 And she dissented from the 
denial of rehearing en banc in Xitronix, arguing that case-specific issues of 
patent validity or enforceability are sufficient to trigger the federal district 
courts’ and the Federal Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction.326  
Finally, at the other end of the spectrum, is Judge Moore. Most significantly, 
she wrote the opinion in Xitronix holding that a case-specific issue of Walker 
Process fraud did not cause the case to arise under patent law.327 Moreover, 
Judge Moore wrote a nonprecedential opinion finding no jurisdiction in a case 
decided one day before Xitronix, Alps South, LLC v. Shumaker, Loop & 
Kendrick.328 That case involved malpractice claims against attorneys who had 
handled prior infringement litigation.329 In holding that federal jurisdiction was 
lacking under § 1338(a), Judge Moore’s opinion noted (quoting the district 
 
 322 Forrester Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. Wheelabrator Techs., Inc., 715 F.3d 1329, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2013); 
Maxchief Invs. Ltd. v. Wok & Pan, Ind., Inc., 909 F.3d 1134, 1140 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 323 Jang v. Bos. Sci. Corp., 767 F.3d 1334, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Forrester, 715 F.3d at 1334). 
 324 Jang v. Bos. Sci. Corp., 532 F.3d 1330, 1334 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 2008), quoted in Jang, 767 F.3d at 1336. 
 325 Forrester, 715 F.3d at 1334. 
 326 Xitronix Corp. v. KLA-Tencor Corp., 892 F.3d 1194, 1195–96 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (Newman, J., 
dissenting from the denial of the petition for rehearing en banc). That said, Judge Newman joined Chief Judge 
Prost’s recent opinion in Inspired Development, which asserted in dicta that a case-specific issue of infringement 
is not sufficient to trigger exclusive federal jurisdiction under § 1338 even if, under Jang, such an issue is 
sufficient to trigger Federal Circuit jurisdiction under § 1295. Inspired Dev., 938 F.3d at 1365. 
 327 Xitronix Corp. v. KLA-Tencor Corp., 882 F.3d 1075, 1075 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 328 No. 2018-1717, 2018 WL 4522168 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 329 Id. at *1. 
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court’s opinion in the case) that the relevant patents “expired years ago, which 
minimizes (or more accurately, eliminates) the prospect of a conflict between a 
state-court decision in this action and a federal decision in another infringement 
action over the same patents.”330  
Based on that description of the case, it seems as if it is on all fours with 
Gunn. The patent issues were case-specific, backward-looking, hypothetical 
questions of validity or infringement of a patent that had already expired. It turns 
out, however, that the district court was wrong that no infringement suit could 
be filed in the future. Judge Moore noted—apparently contrary to the district 
court’s understanding—that “the statute of limitations for seeking damages for 
infringement of the patents has not yet expired.”331 Thus, rather than being on 
all fours with Gunn, Alps South was actually similar to Jang, which upheld 
jurisdiction because adjudication of the patent issue embedded within the breach 
of contract claim could impact a future infringement suit.332  
Nevertheless, Judge Moore ruled—contrary to Jang (but consistent with the 
understanding of Gunn that I urged above)—that such an embedded patent issue 
was not sufficient to create arising under jurisdiction.333 She gave two reasons. 
First, “even if [the plaintiff] brought another suit, the district court correctly 
explained that the state court’s resolution of any patent issues in this malpractice 
case would lack any preclusive effect on that federal action.”334 But that is 
simply not true. As explained above, state court rulings can have preclusive 
effects in future litigation, including litigation in federal court and almost 
certainly in patent cases.335 Second, Judge Moore’s opinion in Alps South noted 
that any state court ruling on infringement or validity “would be limited to the 
patents and those parties.”336 This view—that case-specific issues of validity and 
infringement are insubstantial for jurisdictional purposes—is consistent with the 
opinion in Xitronix that Judge Moore would release the next day. But it is at odds 
with the broader conceptions of arising under jurisdiction embraced by Judges 
Dyk and Newman.337 
 
 330 Id. at *3 (citations omitted). 
 331 Id. 
 332 Jang v. Bos. Sci. Corp., 767 F.3d 1334, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 333 Alps South, 2018 WL 4522168, at *3–4. 
 334 Id. at *3. 
 335 See supra notes 120–24 and accompanying text. 
 336 Alps South, 2018 WL 4522168, at *3. 
 337 In analyzing particular Federal Circuit judges’ views about the scope of arising under jurisdiction, it is 
also worth noting that, before the Supreme Court decided Gunn, Judge O’Malley penned several opinions 
objecting to the Federal Circuit’s then-expansive jurisdictional rule, see Minkin v. Gibbons, P.C., 680 F.3d 1341, 
1353 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (O’Malley, J., concurring); Landmark Screens, LLC v. Morgan, Lewis, & Bockius, LLP, 
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I should repeat that the sample size here is small. On my review of the 
relevant case law, there are only eleven Federal Circuit decisions since Gunn 
that contain a significant analysis of whether arising under jurisdiction exists. 
And six of those decisions seem relatively uncontroversial. In two cases, the 
court approved of jurisdiction over cases involving pure questions of patent law 
that were embedded within claims that were not for patent infringement.338 A 
third case involved claims that actually were for patent infringement.339 Finally, 
three decisions declined jurisdiction over cases that asserted theories of relief 
that had nothing to do with patent law.340  
It is also worth noting that, pursuant to the (infamous?) Federal Circuit Rule 
36, the Federal Circuit resolves a large proportion of its appeals without issuing 
any opinion at all.341 Without performing significantly more research (to wit, 
reviewing every brief in every case decided in a Rule 36 affirmance),342 it is 
impossible to know how many of those cases involved plausible disputes over 
jurisdiction. Still, to see three judges making repeat appearances and taking 
 
676 F.3d 1354, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (O’Malley, J., concurring); USPPS, Ltd. v. Avery Dennison Corp., 676 
F.3d 1341, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (O’Malley, J., concurring), vacated, 569 U.S. 915 (2013); Byrne v. Wood, 
Herron & Evans, LLP, 676 F.3d 1024, 1027 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (O’Malley, J., dissenting from the denial of the 
petition for rehearing en banc); Byrne v. Wood, Herron & Evans, LLP, 450 F. App’x 956, 961 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(authoring majority opinion exercising jurisdiction but questioning the relevant precedent), vacated, 568 U.S. 
1190 (2013). Interestingly, both of Judge O’Malley’s post-Gunn jurisdictional opinions uphold jurisdiction, but 
those cases were relatively easy ones under governing precedent. See infra note 338 and accompanying text. 
 338 Vermont v. MPHJ Tech. Invs., LLC, 803 F.3d 635, 642–43 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (O’Malley, J.); Madstad 
Eng’g, Inc. v. USPTO, 756 F.3d 1366, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (O’Malley, J.). 
 339 Bayer Cropscience AG v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 680 F. App’x 985, 990–91 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (per 
curiam). In Bayer, the original lawsuit was for patent infringement and so plainly arose under patent law; 
jurisdiction was in controversy on appeal because the infringement claim had been sent to arbitration and the 
case before the Federal Circuit was Dow’s appeal from the district court’s refusal to vacate an arbitration award 
in Bayer’s favor. Id. at 990. 
 340 Polidi v. Lee, No. 2018-2277, 2019 WL 5853882, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 8, 2019) (per curiam); Inspired 
Dev. Grp., LLC v. Inspired Prods. Grp., LLC, 938 F.3d 1355, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (Prost, C.J.); NeuroRepair, 
Inc. v. Nath Law Grp., 781 F.3d 1340, 1344–45 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Wallach, J.). With these six cases excluded, 
the five controversial post-Gunn Federal Circuit cases on jurisdiction are: Forrester, Jang, Maxchief, Xitronix, 
and Alps South.  
 341 See Gugliuzza & Lemley, supra note 53, at 779–80 (reporting that, over the past several years, the 
Federal Circuit has resolved between approximately 30% and 35% of appeals from the district courts through 
Rule 36 affirmances). For a scholarly critique of the Federal Circuit’s frequent use of Rule 36, see Dennis 
Crouch, Wrongly Affirmed Without Opinion, 52 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 561 (2017). 
 342 It is possible to do this. Mark Lemley and I—with significant help from research assistants and a 
knowledgeable patent lawyer—did it for our article on Rule 36. See Gugliuzza & Lemley, supra note 53, at 782 
n.84. But it is not easy. See id. at 809 (noting that “many lawyers don’t have the time (or the financial resources) 
to dig through dockets and briefs … to determine the basis for the nearly 200 Rule 36 affirmances the Federal 
Circuit issues every year” and arguing that, instead of opinionless affirmances, the Federal Circuit should 
generally issue a “short, nonprecedential opinion making clear the arguments raised by the appellant (and 
rejected by the court)”).  
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consistent—and diametrically opposed—positions on one particular issue is 
noteworthy and merits attention going forward.  
The panel dependency of Federal Circuit law on matters of jurisdiction (and 
on numerous other issues343) highlights a potential shortcoming of the Federal 
Circuit as an institution: The narrowness of the court’s jurisdiction encourages 
its judges to develop detailed normative preferences about issues of patent law 
and policy, and it provides them with ample opportunities to express and 
implement those preferences. One additional benefit of clearer jurisdictional 
rules—such as the one proposed in this Article—is that they are harder to 
manipulate in service of a preferred policy outcome.  
CONCLUSION 
Confusion about the scope of the federal courts’ and the Federal Circuit’s 
jurisdiction over patent cases is on the rise. This Article has provided an 
extensive review of the relevant precedent and attempted to bring some clarity 
to the legal doctrine. Under the novel approach I propose, for a case to arise 
under patent law, it must present a dispute about the content of federal patent 
law or a question about the interpretation or validity of the federal patent statute. 
This Article has also sought to highlight the normatively questionable basis for 
equating the Federal Circuit’s appellate jurisdiction over patent cases with the 
original jurisdiction of the district courts. Given the panel dependence on 
jurisdictional matters that seems to prevail in the Federal Circuit, subject matter 
jurisdiction, perhaps surprisingly, promises to be one of the most confounding 
and controversial issues in patent litigation for years to come.  
 
 
 343 See id. at 798–99. 
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